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JUDGING THIRD-PARTY FUNDING  
Victoria A. Shannon† 
 
  Third-party funding is an arrangement whereby an outside entity 
finances the legal representation of a party involved in litigation or 
arbitration.  The outside entity – called a “third-party funder” – could be 
a bank, hedge fund, insurance company, or some other entity or individual 
that finances the party's legal representation in return for a profit.  Third-
party funding is a controversial, dynamic, and evolving phenomenon.  The 
practice has attracted both national headlines and the recent attention of 
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The 
Advisory Committee recently declared that “judges currently have the 
power to obtain information about third-party funding when it is relevant 
in a particular case,” but the Committee did not provide any additional 
guidance regarding how to determine the relevance of third-party funding, 
what information to obtain, or from whom to obtain that information.  This 
Article provides that needed guidance.   
  This Article sets forth reinterpretations of procedural rules to provide 
judges and arbitrators with disclosure requirements and a framework for 
handling known issues as they arise.  By interpreting the existing rules as 
suggested in this Article, judges and arbitrators will be able to gain a better 
sense of the prevalence, structures, and impact of third-party funding and 
its effects (if any) on dispute resolution procedures.  Over time, these 
observations will reveal the true systemic impact of third-party funding and 
contribute to developing robust third-party funding regulations.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION:  THIRD-PARTY FUNDING AS A PARADIGM SHIFT IN 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION  
 Law students around the country will have to relearn the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure after they sit for the bar examination.  The 
Federal Rules Advisory Committee has proposed changes to eleven 
Federal Rules and the deletion of the Appendix of the Forms, which will 
take effect on December 1, 2015, unless the Supreme Court or Congress 
takes contrary action.1  Far more interesting than the proposed changes, 
 1  For example, the Supreme Court may decline to prescribe the amendments 
before May 1, 2015 or, if the Supreme Court does prescribe the amendments, then 
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however, are the panoply of disruptive and paradigm-shifting revisions 
that the Advisory Committee has earmarked for future consideration.2  
The most monumental potential changes would address the controversial 
and growing phenomenon of third-party funding, which is an 
arrangement in which a party involved in a dispute seeks funding from 
an outside entity for its legal representation instead of financing its own 
legal representation.3  The Advisory Committee stated in its December 
2014 report that: 
 
Discussion reflected concerns that third-party financing is a 
relatively new and evolving phenomenon.  It takes many forms 
that may present distinctive questions.  A study paper for the 
ABA 20/20 Commission on Ethics4 expressed the hope that 
work will continue to study the impact of funding on counsel’s 
independence, candor, confidentiality, and undivided loyalty.  
The Committee agreed that the questions raised by third-party 
financing are important.  But they have not been fully identified, 
and may change as practices develop further.  In addition, the 
Committee agreed that judges currently have the power to obtain 
information about third party funding when it is relevant in a 
particular case.  An attempt to craft rules now would be 
December 1, 2015.  If the Supreme Court transmits the amendments and Congress 
does not act, then by statute, the amendments will become law and take effect on 
December 1, 2015.  See infra note 73 for a complete explanation of the rules revision 
process.  See also Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, (Sep. 2014), 13, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf 
(quoting Rule 1).  For a full discussion of the proposed revisions, see id. at 13-18 
(summary of revisions), B-1 to B-77 (specific language of proposed revisions). 
 2  Examples of such changes include implementing electronic filing and service 
of process for court documents and grappling with the question of whether attorney 
fees are appropriate sanctions in light of deep concerns about cost shifting under the 
“American Rule.”  See Hon. David G. Campbell, Report of Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, (Dec. 2, 
2014), 3-12, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2014.pdf. 
 3  See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
 4  See generally AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/201112
12_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_
report.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER] (describing how a lawyer 
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premature.  These questions will not be pursued now.5 
 
The Advisory Committee declared that federal judges clearly have 
the power to handle third-party funding under the existing rules but did 
not give any guidance on how to implement this mandate.6  This 
monumental pronouncement generates a multitude of questions without 
providing ready answers.  What is third-party funding?  What are federal 
judges’ responsibilities under the Federal Rules with respect to third-
party funding?  Which aspects of the federal rules are affected by third-
party funding?  How should judges determine what information to obtain 
regarding third-party funding and from whom to obtain that information?  
This article addresses these questions and provides guidance to federal 
judges regarding how to interpret the existing Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure until the Advisory Committee decides to tackle the question of 
rule revisions.  This article also provides guidance to arbitrators regarding 
how to handle third-party funding, since, as this article explains, 
arbitration and litigation are inextricably intertwined, and rules of 
arbitration procedure will likely not be revised any time soon either.7  
Finally, this article presents advice to the future Advisory Committee and 
arbitral bodies that would revise procedural rules to address third-party 
funding.   
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows.  Part II of this 
article introduces and defines third-party funding.  Part III of this article 
addresses the problems that arise due to the Federal Rules not addressing 
third-party funding explicitly.  Part IV of this article tackles the debate 
the regarding whether to revise the Federal Rules or reinterpret the 
existing rules and concludes that the Advisory Committee’s approach of 
leaving third-party funding to judicial interpretation is the most 
appropriate course of action at this time.  Part V proposes 
reinterpretations of the existing Federal Rules that judges can implement 
immediately when encountering third-party funding in a case.  Part VI 
provides advice to the Advisory Committee regarding how to revise the 
Federal Rules in the future.   
 5  See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 4 (internal footnote added by 
this article’s author). 
 6  See id. at 3-4. 
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II. THE PHENOMENON:  WHAT IS THIRD-PARTY FUNDING? 
Third-party funding8 is an arrangement in which a party involved in 
a dispute seeks funding from an outside entity for its legal representation 
instead of financing its own legal representation.9 The outside entity – 
called a “third-party funder” – finances the party's legal representation in 
return for a profit.10 The third-party funder could be a bank, hedge fund, 
insurance company, or some other entity or individual.11 If the funded 
party is the plaintiff, then the funder contracts to receive a percentage or 
fraction of the proceeds from the case if the plaintiff wins.12 Unlike a 
loan, the funded plaintiff does not have to repay the funder if it loses the 
case or does not recover any money.13 If the funded party is the defendant, 
then the funder contracts to receive a predetermined payment from the 
defendant, similar to an insurance premium, and the agreement may 
include an extra payment to the funder if the defendant wins the case.14   
Third-party funding is rapidly increasing in prevalence around the 
world in both litigation and arbitration.15 Increasingly, banks, hedge 
funds, and other financial institutions are funding the legal representation 
of parties to litigation and arbitration cases as a type of investment.16 This 
phenomenon is growing in importance and is estimated to be a 
 8 The Advisory Committee used the terms “third-party funding,” “third-party 
financing,” and “third-party litigation financing” in its report.  See id.  Some scholars 
use the term “third-party litigation funding” or “litigation funding” to refer to this 
phenomenon.  This article intentionally uses the term “third-party funding”—
without the word “litigation”—because this article addresses funding of both 
litigation and arbitration, domestically and internationally. 
 9  See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?  Third Party 
Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV 1268 (2011) (defining third-party funding).  A 
party may also engage both a contingency fee attorney and a third-party litigation 
funder to work together on its case. 
 10  See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 4-11 (2012)  (describing the players in third-party 
funding, the types of funding relationships, and the effect of the type of funder on 
the attorney-client relationship).    
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on 
Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 162, 180-181 (2011). 
 16  See generally Fulbrook Management LLC, Investing in Commercial Claims 
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multibillion-dollar industry both domestically and internationally.17 In 
addition, depending on the structure of the funding arrangement, the 
funder may legally control or influence aspects of the legal representation 
or may completely take over the case and step into the shoes of the 
original party.18  The United States is home to dozens of funders of 
consumer disputes, like personal injury claims and other tort claims, and 
funders of large complex corporate disputes.19 In light of its increasing 
prevalence, there is a fascinating debate regarding the place of third-party 
 17  See, e.g., Jennifer Smith, Litigation Investors Gain Ground in U.S., WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 12, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579316621131
535960 (several funders have several hundreds of millions of dollars in assets under 
management); Jennifer Smith, Investors Put Up Millions of Dollars to Fund 
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323820304578408794155
816934 (“…Gerchen Keller Capital LLC, a Chicago-based team that includes 
former lawyers … has raised more than $100 million and says there is plenty of 
room for newcomers given the size of the U.S. litigation market, which they put at 
more than $200 billion, measuring the money spent by plaintiffs and defendants on 
litigation.”); Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes 
Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2011), (“The new breed of profit-seeker sees a huge, 
untapped market for betting on high-stakes commercial claims. After all, companies 
will spend about $15.5 billion this year on U.S. commercial litigation and an 
additional $2.6 billion on intellectual-property litigation, according to estimates by 
BTI Consulting Group Inc., a Wellesley, Mass., research firm that surveyed 300 
large companies in 2011.”); Excend, Press Release: Excend Engaged as Advisory 
[sic] for Multi-Billion Dollar Judgment Litigation Funding, (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.excend.com/press/2012-05-09-Excend-Engaged-as-Advisor-for-Multi-
Billion-Dollar-Judgment-Litigation-Funding.pdf. 
 18  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 8 (explaining that some 
third-party funding arrangements are structured as an assignment in which the third-
party funder becomes the claimant in the case and the original party is no longer 
involved).  For an in-depth treatment of assignment and insurance policies in the 
third-party funding context, see generally, Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits 
After the Event:  From Champerty to Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2011); 
Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1297 (2002); Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort 
Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11 (2013); 
Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 
(1987). 
 19  Regarding consumer disputes, there are over 30 third-party funding companies 
funding consumer claims as members of the American Legal Finance Association 
(ALFA), http://www.americanlegalfin.com/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2015), as well as 
several other third-party funding companies that are not members of ALFA funding 
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funding both in the American legal system and in the context of 
international dispute resolution.20 
There are four main drivers of the third-party funding industry 
worldwide.  First, funders help individuals bring claims that they would 
not otherwise be able to bring, which supports the public policy ideal of 
increasing access to justice for indigent or disadvantaged persons.21  
Second, many insolvent companies and small companies are seeking a 
means to pursue valid claims that they could not otherwise afford to 
pursue and that are too risky for a contingency fee attorney to accept.22  
 20  See, e.g., Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time:  A Systems Thinking Analysis of the 
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 
504, 508, 513-523, 523 n.113, 526-527 (2006); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation 
Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 56-57, 68-69, 72, 74, 77 (2004); Susan Lorde 
Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the 
United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 673, 673-685 (2008); Anthony J. Sebok, The 
Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 72 n.36, 139 (2011); Courtney R. 
Barksdale, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold:  Analyzing the Costs and Benefits of 
Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 735 (2007); Steinitz, supra note 9, at  1325-
1336; Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress:  Third-Party Funding of American 
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV 571, 608-609 (2010); Max Radin, Maintenance by 
Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 74-75 (1935) (arguing for the regulation of 
contingency fees in a way similar to today’s arguments for regulating third-party 
funding); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 
377-439 (2009) (proposing defense-side funding in the United States that would be 
similar to after-the-event insurance in Europe); Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, 
Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act:  A Regulatory Framework to Legitimize 
Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 347, 350-361 (2004) 
(proposing a statute to regulate third-party funding for individual consumers).  See 
also infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 21  See David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First 
Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1076 
n.3, 1077 n.6, 1077 n.7 (2013) (reporting the results of their study on public data on 
third-party funding available in Australia). 
 22  See Raconteur Media, Raconteur on Legal Efficiency, THE TIMES 
(SUPPLEMENT), 7-9, (Mar. 25, 2010), 
http://np.netpublicator.com/netpublication/n89269938; Steinitz (2011), supra note 
9, at 1275-1276, 1283-1284; Martin (2004), supra note 20, at 67 n.93; Martin (2008), 
supra note 20, at 685; James D. Dana & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent 
Fees:  The Roles of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 349, 365-366 (1993); Doug Jones, Third-Party Funding of Arbitration, 
paper given at Hot Topics in International Arbitration at SJ Berwin, 7 (London, Sep. 
22, 2008) (on file with the author); Ralph Lindeman, “Third-Party Investors Offer 
New funding Source for Major Commercial Lawsuits,” THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL 
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Third, many large companies that are constantly sued (such as insurance 
companies or manufacturers of dangerous products) are seeking a means 
to even out the litigation line item on their balance sheets, and funders 
can offer them a fixed payment system for managing their litigation costs 
as defendants.23  Fourth, the worldwide market turmoil over the past 
several years has led many investors to seek investments not dependent 
upon the financial markets, stock prices, or company valuations.24 Each 
litigation or arbitration matter is its own separate entity and is 
independent from market conditions in terms of the value of the 
underlying harm or liability.25 This independence shields the third-party 
funder’s investment and potential profit from the general uncertainty 
present in the global financial markets. 26  
Since litigation and arbitration have both become attractive 
investment vehicles, unsurprisingly, both reputable and unsavory third-
 23  See, e.g., Fulbrook Capital Management, LLC, Third-Party Litigation 
Funding, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, (May 2012), 
http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-litigation-funding/ (“Third-party 
funding offers corporate clients the opportunity to move the financial risk and cost 
of litigation off their balance sheets.”); Kevin LaCroix, What’s Happening Now? 
Litigation Funding, Apparently, THE D&O DIARY, (Apr. 9, 2013) 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/04/articles/securities-litigation/whats-
happening-now-litigation-funding-apparently/ (“Litigation funding proponents 
contend that the funding arrangements helps to level the playing field by allowing 
litigants to pursue lawsuits against better financed opponents, or simply allowing 
litigants to keep litigation costs off their balance sheet. It seems clear that as the 
litigation funding field grows, the funding companies are offering new approaches 
– for example, the defense side option that the Gerchen Keller firm will be offering, 
or the ‘defense costs cover’ that provided protection for prospective RBS claimants 
sufficient for them to be able to take on litigation in the U.K. notwithstanding the 
‘loser pays’ litigation model that prevails there.”); David Lat, Litigation Finance: 
The Next Hot Trend?, ABOVETHELAW.COM, (Apr. 8, 2013) 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/04/litigation-finance-the-next-hot-trend/ (“Ashley 
Keller [of Gerchen Keller Capital]:  You’re certainly right that a lot of these clients 
have balance sheet capacity and could fund out of pocket. Notwithstanding their 
balance sheet capacities, there might be institutional constraints. If a company has a 
$5 billion claim, it will pursue it. But what if it has a $50 million or $100 million 
claim? If you’re a general counsel, a lot of C-suite executives are viewing your office 
as a cost center. It’s not that easy to walk to the CFO’s office and ask for $5 million 
or $10 million to finance offensive litigation. That will immediately hit the P&L of 
the company and affect earnings per share, but the outcome is uncertain and 
contingent. We think a fair number of meritorious claims are being left on the table 
notwithstanding balance sheet capacity.”). 
 24  See Steinitz (2011), supra note 9, at 1283-1284. 
 25  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 12. 
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party funders have flocked to this market.27 However, despite the 
existence of so many funders, there is little regulation of the industry at 
present, and the existing regulations are not comprehensive.28 The lack 
of regulation or guidelines is creating a situation in which potential clients 
of third-party funding have no way of knowing which funders are 
reputable and which are untrustworthy.29 Market regulation would help 
inform consumers of the baseline requirements for a compliant third-
party funder.30 It would also inform noncompliant funders of what they 
need to do to become compliant if they do not want to lose the business 
of well-informed clients or want to avoid sanctions.31 Scholars, 
legislators, judges, attorneys, and even funders themselves have called 
for regulation of the third-party funding industry.32  As a first step, the 
Advisory Committee has charged judges with devising ways to handle 
issues that may arise with respect to third-party financing while also 
 27  For an example of a less savory third-party funding situation, see Weaver, 
Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450-42 (W.D.N.C. 
2001) (federal district court awarded treble damages to a law firm against a third-
party funder for tortious interference with the law firm’s retainer agreement with its 
client due to the how the funder’s compensation was calculated in the third-party 
funding agreement with the same client). 
 28  See, generally, Heather Morton, Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 
2014 Legislation, National Conference of State Legislatures, Jun. 4, 2014, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/litigation-funding-
transactions-2014-legislation.aspx (listing proposed and passed legislation state by 
state); Richard A. Blunk, Have the States Properly Addressed the Evils of Consumer 
Litigation Finance?, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 
http://litigationfinancecontract.com/have-the-states-properly-addressed-the-evils-
of-consumer-litigation-finance/ (describing the third-party funding statutes in 
Maine, Ohio, Nebraska and Oklahoma).  As of June 2014, the states that have passed 
legislation either allowing or prohibiting third-party funding of consumer claims are 
Maine, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Nebraska, New York (allowed for large 
commercial disputes), and Tennessee.  The states that have proposed legislation in 
this area are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana (other bills proposed), Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Vermont.  Other states either have case law or attorney ethics opinions.  See 
NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 144-59 (51-jurisdiction survey of 
existing state laws as of early 2012). 
 29  See generally, Victoria Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding 
Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2015) (forthcoming in Feb. 2015) (explaining 
why existing regulations are insufficient and confusing and why the third-party 
funding industry needs harmonized regulations in three areas:  the procedure, the 
transaction, and the ethics). 
 30  See id. at 107-08. 
 31  See id.  
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ensuring “‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.’”33  However, an inequitable administration of the 
Federal Rules or of rules of arbitration could lead to undesirable 
inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and injustices.  Thus, this article offers a 
template for interpreting and administering the rules of litigation and 
arbitration procedure to take into account the existence of third-party 
funding.  
This article builds on prior scholarly work that proposes a 
harmonized regulatory framework for third-party funding in three 
categories:  the procedural, the transactional, and the ethical categories.34  
A harmonized regulatory framework would include key regulation within 
each of those three categories and would link those regulations together 
through cross-references to create a harmonized regulatory framework.35  
This approach would weave a regulatory “safety net” of minimum 
standards for behaviors and interactions of the players in third-party 
funding arrangements.36 It would also ensure the integrity of a dispute 
resolution system involving funders and the stability of any financial 
products that may derive from third-party funding.37 
Regulations in the procedural category (set forth in this article) 
address the ways in which funders participate in or influence the 
procedure of litigation or arbitration, including the potential waiver of 
evidentiary privileges for information disclosed to a funder.38  
Regulations in the transactional category would address the viability of 
the funder as a business, including capitalization requirements, licensure, 
and other best practices, such as disclosures to potential clients of 
funders.39  Regulations in the ethical category would address issues 
relating to the conflicts of interest that may arise during the negotiation 
of the funding arrangement, as well as the funder’s effect on the attorney-
client relationship.40  This article focuses on the procedural regulations 
and, specifically, suggests reinterpretations of litigation and arbitration 
rules and certain evidentiary privileges to take into account the existence 
and participation of third-party funders. 
 
 33  See supra note 1 (quoting Rule 1). 
 34 See Shannon (2015), supra note 29, at 107-08.   
 35  See id. 
 36  See id. 
 37  See id. 
 38  See Shannon (2015), supra note 29, at 136-42; see also infra Part V. 
 39  See id. at 129-36. 
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III.  THE PROBLEM:  RULES OF PROCEDURE ARE SILENT REGARDING 
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING 
Third-party funders are indirect participants in litigation and 
arbitration, even if the decision maker (i.e., the judge, jury, or arbitrator), 
the opposing party, and the opposing party's attorney are unaware of the 
funder's participation.41  Like other indirect participants in dispute 
resolution, funders should be subject to the rules of litigation and 
arbitration.42 How should judges treat the participation of a third-party 
funder in litigation or arbitration as a matter of procedure?  Funders do 
not fit neatly into any of the typical roles outlined in litigation or 
arbitration rules.  Funders are intentionally not parties or co-parties (in 
order to avoid liability),43 not legal counsel (although they are often 
 41  Parties often employ other entities to assist them in litigation without the 
opposing side’s knowledge, such as non-testifying consultants, non-testifying 
experts, accountants, and other agents.  Several types of such entities are listed as 
party “representatives” in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B).  See infra note 135 and 
accompanying text.  Based on the substance of their activities during the litigation, 
funders fall with the definitions of those “representatives” enumerated in the rule in 
the rules.  Id. 
 42  See supra note 41.  Since many entities that are not direct participants in 
litigation are enumerated or referenced in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
third-party funders should also be referenced, as discussed throughout this article. 
 43  Furthermore, a third-party funder usually should not be joined as party.  A 
claim-side funder is not a “real party in interest” under FED. R. CIV. P. 17, unless the 
funder buys the claim outright and takes an assignment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1) 
(“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”) (emphasis 
added). The rule requires that the party possessing the substantive right at issue must 
prosecute the case.  The rule applies only to plaintiffs and is intended to prevent 
defendants from having to face multiple lawsuits over the exact same legal right or 
interest.  See, e.g., Curtis Lumber Co. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 618 F.3d 762, 771 
(8th Cir. 2010) (stating that the purpose of FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) is to ensure that the 
defendant will face only one suit and will obtain the benefit of res judicata against 
any future action based on the exact same legal interest); Marina Mangement 
Services, Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Rule 17(a) 
protects a defendant against a subsequent claim for the same debt underlying a 
previously entered judgment.”). If the funder takes an assignment of the claim, then 
the funder should be the plaintiff on record in the case.  Since such a funder would 
pursue the claim or defense in its own name as the real party in interest, the funder 
in such an instance would be treated as a party already under the existing rules.  Most 
funders, by contrast, take an interest only in the potential proceeds from the case 
(claim side) or receive periodic payments from the client similar to an insurance 
premium (defense side).  Thus, FED. R. CIV. P. 17, as it is currently written, would 
apply in the context of a funder taking an assignment of a claim and does not need 
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lawyers),44 and not witnesses (although disclosures of privileged 
information to a funder may make that information discoverable by the 
opposing side in jurisdictions that do not extend evidentiary privileges to 
disclosures made to funders).45  Funders are not amicus curiae (since they 
do not make submissions, although they certainly support the position of 
the funded party in the case).46  They are certainly not judges, arbitrators, 
courts or arbitral institutions (although they do make prima facie 
determinations about the case that may determine whether the case 
actually goes forward or not and, therefore, are similar to a judge or 
arbitrator ruling on a motions to dismiss).47  Funders are not third-party 
beneficiaries of a contract, because they cannot enforce the funded 
party’s claim independently of the funded party, unless they purchase the 
claim outright and become a party through assignment.48  Unlike 
insurance companies, third-party funders usually do not agree to pay the 
underlying judgment, so the insurance analogy does not quite fit either.49 
Most funders think of themselves as investors, and an investor in 
litigation or arbitration is a new species of participant uncontemplated in 
the existing rules of procedure.50 
Although funders do not currently fit within any of the preexisting 
defined roles in litigation or arbitration, they often find themselves pulled 
into the proceedings either directly or indirectly.51  For example, most 
sophisticated funders are already aware of jurisdictions that allow courts 
and arbitral tribunals to issue cost orders that can reach third parties or 
allow parties to join funders as parties in cost proceedings.52  In some 
jurisdictions, funders view adverse costs orders or orders for security for 
costs as simply the cost of doing business in that jurisdiction.53  In the 
whatsoever to the underlying substantive dispute; hence, they are not the “real party 
in interest” under FED. R. CIV. P. 17. 
 44  Examples of third-party funders that have lawyers as leaders or principals 
include ARCA Capital Partners, BridgePoint Financial Services, Burford Capital 
Group, Calunius Capital, Fulbrook Management LLC, Gerchen Keller Capital, 
Harbour Litigation Funding Ltd., IMF (Australia) Ltd., Bentham IMF Ltd., IM 
Litigation Funding, The Judge Limited, Juridica Investments, and Therium. 
 45  See infra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 46  See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 47  See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 48  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 49  See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 50  See, generally, Max Volsky, INVESTING IN JUSTICE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL FINANCES, LAWSUIT ADVANCES AND LITIGATION FUNDING (2013). 
 51  See, e.g., supra note 27; infra note 215. 
 52  See, e.g., NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 27-28. 
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United States, there are state long-arm statutes and a rather low threshold 
for personal jurisdiction in light of the e-commerce age.54  Thus, the 
funder’s actions while funding litigation in a United States court may 
create the “minimum contacts” that could subject it to the jurisdiction of 
a United States court hearing a funded case or ruling on the enforcement 
or annulment of a funded arbitral award.55  Furthermore, arbitral tribunals 
have previously issued cost orders against funders based on the domestic 
rules of the procedural seat of arbitration, even though the funder has not 
signed the underlying arbitration agreement.56  Courts and arbitral 
tribunals may also be able to exert jurisdiction over third-party funders 
under doctrines that allow jurisdiction over a non-signatory to the 
arbitration agreement or a non-signatory to the underlying contract who 
has a financial interest in the outcome of the dispute.57 
Moreover, conflicts of interest may arise if a judge or arbitrator is 
somehow linked to the third-party funder.58  However, if the identity of 
the funder is not disclosed at the outset, then the later revelation of the 
connection could create disastrous and costly results for the parties.59  
From the perspective of our legal system, the main purpose of the 
involvement of a third-party funder is to reduce the funded party’s cost 
burden and risk of losing the case.  However, nondisclosure of a funder’s 
participation can lead to additional costs for that party later.60  For 
example, additional costs may be incurred if a judge is accused of bias 
under 28 U.S.C. § 144 because of her connection to a funder or has to 
recuse herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because of her connection to a 
funder.61  The funded party may also incur costs if an arbitral award or 
 54  See, generally, A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for 
our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 325 (2009); Eric C. Hawkins, General 
Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts: What Role, if any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale 
Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2371 (2006). 
 55  See supra note 54. 
 56  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, passim (citing cases in Australia, 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries in which an arbitral 
tribunal or court ordered a non-party funder to pay costs or provide security for 
costs); infra note 215. 
 57  See generally STAVROS BREKOULAKIS, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2010). 
 58  See infra Part III (discussing the potential conflicts of interest that could arise 
due to an undisclosed connection between a judge and a funder and the consequences 
of nondisclosure). 
 59  Id. 
 60  See supra note 58. 
 61  See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (addressing bias or prejudice of a judge); 28 
U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (addressing the disqualification a judge due to a financial 
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court judgment is challenged based on the appearance bias of the judge 
or arbitrator because of some undisclosed connection with the funder, 
even if there was no actual bias.  Reinterpreting rules of litigation and 
arbitration procedures to address the issue of the funder’s hidden 
participation will inform the judge or arbitrator in the case that the funder 
is involved.   
Currently, there are only two types of dispute resolutions procedures 
funded worldwide: litigation and arbitration.62 Thus, regulating the 
participation of third-party funders in the process of dispute resolution 
would consist of reinterpreting or modifying the rules for both 
procedures.  For the reasons discussed in Part IV, rule revisions are 
premature; thus, this article proposes reinterpreting rules of litigation and 
arbitration procedure to address issues raised by the growing 
phenomenon of third-party funding.63  This article proposes pragmatic 
reinterpretations of the existing language of specific rules regarding 
discovery, disclosures, privileges, conflicts of interest, cost allocation, 
sanctions, class actions, and enforcement.64  These reinterpretations will 
provide courts and arbitrators with disclosure requirements and a 
framework for handling conflicts of interest and other known issues as 
 62 Third-party funders only fund litigation and arbitration, because funders need 
a result that is enforceable in court in order to ensure that they will be able to collect 
the award or legal costs—in jurisdictions with a rule that the loser pays the legal 
costs—from the losing party. While a judge or arbitrator could convert a mediated 
settlement agreement into a judgment or award, there is no guarantee that a judge or 
arbitrator would be willing to do so or that the parties would want an enforceable 
result from mediation. Furthermore, a failure of the mediation process is essentially 
a financial stalemate, and the parties must still incur the cost of litigation or 
arbitrating their unresolved dispute. Funders are not attracted to pure mediation 
cases due to this uncertainty, even though mediation is often far cheaper than 
litigation or arbitration. However, funders may fund a case involving a multi-staged 
dispute resolution clause calling for mediation followed by litigation or arbitration 
if the mediation is unsuccessful. 
 63  Why focus on the federal rules rather than state rules?  State rules vary too 
widely for a realistic proposal of a model state rule.  In addition, state court rules 
tend generally to follow trends in Federal Rules.  The Federal Rules set an example 
and, to that end, are quintessentially “model” state rules.  Nevertheless, state laws 
govern evidentiary privileges.  See infra Part V.A.1 (discussing revisions to state 
laws governing the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine). 
 64  The author examined all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine 
whether the existence of third-party funding could have an effect on the 
administration of the rule.  The author determined that rules relating to disclosure, 
discovery, privileges, sanctions, and class actions are the only rules that could 
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they arise.65 If procedural problems with respect to third-party funding 
become prevalent or recurrent, then rule revisions may become necessary 
at that time.  Meanwhile, by implementing the reinterpretations set forth 
in this article, courts, judges, arbitrators, arbitral institutions, and 
legislators will be able to gain a better sense of the prevalence of third-
party funding and its effects (if any) on dispute resolution procedures.       
IV.  THE DEBATE:  REVISE OR REINTERPRET PROCEDURAL RULES?  
Although the Advisory Committee has hinted that rule revision will 
likely take place in the future, there are compelling arguments against 
revising the rules to address third-party funding at this time.66  First, the 
Advisory Committee has correctly stated that third-party funding “takes 
many forms that may present distinctive questions” and that “the 
questions raised by third-party financing are important [b]ut … have not 
been fully identified, and may change as practices develop further.”67  
Revising procedural rules is particularly difficult when new situations 
arise, particularly this early in the existence of the third-party funding 
industry.  
For example, the Advisory Committee has been observing the 
growing number of courts allowing or requiring electronic filing of 
documents but has intentionally refrained (up to now) from revising the 
Federal Rules to address electronic filing.68  Furthermore, the Advisory 
 65 See infra Part V (addressing issues relating to disclosure frameworks, 
privileges, sanctions, and class actions). 
 66  See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
 67  Id. at 4. 
 68  C.f., Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, (Apr. 10. 2014), 29-
30, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil
/CV2014-04.pdf (reflecting in the minutes of the Nov. 2013 meeting of the Advisory 
Committee a discussion regarding addressing electronic filings in the Federal Rules:  
“One reason for caution is the hope that courts and lawyers will be able to work 
together to develop sensible solutions to problems as they arise, and that this process 
will provide a better foundation for new rules than more abstract consideration. If 
there are no general calls for help, no widespread complaints that the rules need to 
be brought into the present and near future, perhaps there is no need to rush ahead 
on a broad basis….  A committee member suggested that it is worthwhile to look at 
these questions more thoughtfully, but not immediately. ‘There are issues out there, 
but they are not yet big issues. Time will bring more information.’ We should do the 
obvious things now, and find out whether lawyers are complaining about other 
things. A broader view noted that this discussion reflects a regular pattern in 
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Committee observed and assessed discovery disputes regarding 
electronically stored information (ESI) for several years under the current 
rules modified by local case law and local rules before proposing the 
current amendments to address e-discovery.69  The amendments to the 
rules were intended to address directly problems with ESI that had arisen 
in the courts.70  Thus, it is likely that the Advisory Committee plans to 
wait to see how judges and arbitrators handle third-party funding before 
revising the Federal Rules.   
Similarly, arbitral institutions worldwide have refrained from 
revising their rules to address third-party funding in order to maintain the 
trans-substantivity of arbitration rules and avoid clashing with the 
applicable national laws regarding third-party funding chosen by the 
parties or the laws of the procedural seat of arbitration.71  The 
International Bar Association (IBA) is the only organization that has 
revised any arbitration-related rules to address third-party funding.72 The 
IBA Guidelines are optional rather than mandatory, however, so the 
systemic impact of their revisions remains uncertain.  In essence, the 
and provide for it. Or we can wait and codify what the world has come to do, at least 
generally. ‘We do want to reflect what people are doing. But perhaps not just yet.’ 
States ‘may get ahead of us.’ And we can learn from them.”) 
 69  See id. at 369-535 (detailing the history and arguments regarding Proposed 
Rule 37(e), which addresses evidentiary sanctions for electronically stored 
information).   
 70  See id. 
 71  Arbitration is supposed to transcend substantive laws, but also be compatible 
with those laws.  Parties can choose arbitration and whatever substantive laws they 
prefer.  In this way, arbitration is trans-substantive.  Some countries or states prohibit 
third-party funding while others allow it.  The arbitral institutions cannot adopt 
arbitration rules that conflict with either of those positions.  Therefore, the arbitration 
institutions will likely remain neutral and not address third-party funding in their 
arbitration rules. Hence, for arbitration, there is no uniform way to address third-
party funding.  There are dozens of arbitration rules in use worldwide, and parties 
can even fashion their own arbitration procedure by agreement, if they prefer.  The 
arbitration institutions will likely not change their arbitration rules to address third-
party funding, because it would be too difficult to come to a consensus about what 
the new rule should be.  Thus, the best vehicle to address third-party funding in 
arbitration is through guidelines or codes of best practices.  See Jim Saksa, Victoria 
Shannon Discusses The State of the Legal Funding Industry at Home and in 
International Arbitration,  LEGAL FUNDING CENTRAL – LFC360 BLOG (Jul. 31, 
2014), http://legalfundingcentral.com/lfc360/new/legal-funding-expert-victoria-
shannon-discusses-state-industry-home-international-arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2015).  Cf. infra note 257 regarding the debate over the trans-substantive nature 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
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third-party funding industry is nascent and understudied in the United 
States and many other jurisdictions around the world, so rule revisions 
undertaken now would like not be well-informed. 
Second, amending the Federal Rules73 and amending rules of 
arbitration74 are both complex, lengthy processes.  As history indicates, 
revising even one rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or rules of 
arbitration may take years.75  Most rules of arbitration are revised only 
once or twice within a decade, and the major arbitral institutions have 
adopted revisions to their rules recently enough for additional revisions 
to be many years away.76   
Observing the effects of third-party funding in the litigation and 
arbitration systems would be ideal before proposing rule revisions; 
however, under the current rules, courts and arbitrators are not informed 
when third-party funding is involved in a case.  As discussed in Part V, 
judges and arbitrators can interpret the existing the rules to mandate 
disclosure to the decision maker to ensure that decision makers are aware 
of the funder's involvement in cases they are hearing.  Judges and 
arbitrators can then observe the case and develop a sense of what is 
working or not working about the funder’s participation and observe how 
smoothly, efficiently, and fairly the case progresses to a resolution.  If 
there are problems, judges can report this information to their districts’ 
delegates to the Judicial Conference of the United States, established 
under 28 U.S.C. § 331, so that the Conference might consider future rule 
 73  For an overview of the rules revision process, see 28 U.S.C. § 2074-75; 
Overview for the Bench Bar and Public, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-
rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-public.aspx (explaining the entire 
rules revision process in detail); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, VOL. 1, § 440, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-
rulemaking/laws-procedures-governing-work-rules/rules-committee-
procedures.aspx (explaining the process of rule revision in the Standing Committee 
in detail); About the Rulemaking Process, , 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking.aspx; Pending 
Rules Amendments http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/pending-
rules.aspx (describing the procedures for revising the Federal Rules). 
 74  See, e.g., Jason Fry & Victoria Shannon, The 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE 
FORDHAM PAPERS 2011, 187-201  (Arthur Rovine ed., 2012) (describing the 
complex process for revising the ICC Rules of Arbitration). 
 75  See supra note 73; Fry & Shannon, supra note 74. 
 76  For example, six of the most widely used sets of arbitration rules in the world 
were revised within the past five years:  two were revised in 2014, two in 2013, one 
in 2012, and one in 2010.  Cf. infra notes 148 and 184 citing provisions from those 
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revisions to address such problems.77  Arbitrators can report this 
information to the arbitral institution overseeing their cases.78  This 
reporting will help educate those undertaking the lengthy rules revision 
processes long before amendments would actually be proposed. 
Third, the Federal Rules authorize "construing" the Federal Rules 
and creating local court rules and judicially-created rules when needed, 
which may be sufficient to address issues relating to third-party 
funding.79  Rule 1 provides that the rules “should be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding,” and a proposed revision to Rule 1 would 
put the same duty on the parties to each case.80  Arbitration rules contain 
 77  See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (describing the function of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, which includes “mak[ing] a comprehensive survey of the 
condition of business in the courts,” “submit[ting] suggestions and 
recommendations to the various courts to promote uniformity of management 
procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business,”  “carry[ing] on a 
continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and 
procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other 
courts of the United States pursuant to law,” and “recommend[ing] [rule changes] 
from time to time to the Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption, 
modification or rejection, in accordance with law.”) 
 78  In the case of ad hoc arbitration, the arbitrator would report to the appointing 
authority, if there is one involved. If there is no appointing authority, then that 
particular arbitrator would likely not have a duty to report the involvement of the 
third-party funder to any outside entity. The arbitrator would have to report to the 
parties in the ad hoc arbitration if the arbitrator has a conflict of interest with respect 
to the third-party funder’s participation. 
 79  See infra notes 80 and 82. 
 80  Note that a pending proposed revision to Rule 1 would add a duty on the parties 
to employ the rules in a cooperative manner.  See Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at 92-93 (“The published proposal amends Rule 
1 to direct that the rules ‘be construed, and administered, and employed by the court 
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.’ … Cooperation among the parties was a theme heavily and 
frequently emphasized at the Duke Conference. It has been vigorously urged, and 
principles of cooperation have been drafted by concerned organizations. There is 
little opposition to the basic concept of cooperation….  A more specific question, 
largely ignored in the comments, asks whether the parties should be directed to 
construe and administer the rules, as well as to employ them, to the desired ends. 
The rule could be written: “construed and administered by the court, and employed 
by the parties, to secure * * *.” But on balance it seems better to retain the hint that 
the parties should undertake to construe the rules for their intended purposes, and — 
to the extent that the parties commonly administer the rules, as in discovery — to 
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a similar provision.81 Rule 83 authorizes the creation of new procedural 
rules at the grassroots level on an ad hoc basis to address new situations 
and needs.82  For example, Rule 83(a) provides that district courts can 
make their own local rules if there is no preexisting federal rule on the 
subject, and Rule 83(b) states that “a judge may regulate practice in any 
manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
[rules made by the U.S. Supreme Court], and § 2075 [bankruptcy rules], 
and the district’s local rules.”83  Thus, the Federal Rules already provide 
district courts and judges with the authority to construe and apply the 
existing Federal Rules, or to create new local rules, to take into account 
third-party funding.   
Some perceptive judges have occasionally asked parties outright 
when they suspect that a funder is involved in the case.84  The 
disadvantage of this approach is that there could be conflicting judicial 
practices or local court rules regarding third-party funding in various 
jurisdictions, which would lead to confusion regarding how third-party 
funding is or should be handled by federal courts.  As of now, there is 
insufficient data on the prevalence of third-party funding in U.S. litigation 
to determine whether conflicting rules among federal districts would 
actually create a problem.  Standardizing regulation has costs as well as 
benefits, so standardization should be employed only if necessary to solve 
a particular problem.  In arbitration, arbitrators have somewhat more 
flexible procedural standards and can devise procedures and rules tailored 
to the parties’ needs, but they must also be notified of the funder’s 
participation in order to disclose potential conflicts of interest, if any.85  
Fourth, more instances of both effective and problematic funding 
need to be observed in the courts and arbitrations over a longer period 
before comprehensive rule revision proposals can be formulated.  At 
present, potentially problematic funding arrangements are revealed in 
court or in an arbitration only when the funding agreement is disputed or 
challenged.86  Satisfied parties and funders proceed with their 
arrangements silently under our current rules, so there is no mechanism 
 81  See, e.g., infra note 250. 
 82  See FED. R. CIV P. 83 (authorizing district courts “to adopt and amend rules 
governing its practice” provided that “[a] local rule must be consistent with—but not 
duplicate—federal statutes and rules” and authorizing that “[a] judge may regulate 
practice in any manner consistent with federal law, [the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the bankruptcy rules], and the district’s local rules….”). 
 83  See supra note 82. 
 84  See, e.g., infra note 215. 
 85  See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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for observing best practices to determine the appropriate behavior as the 
basis for formulating new or revised rules.  Thus, formulating rules or 
revisions at this stage may be reactionary and would likely be based 
largely on addressing observed problems that may be outliers, rather than 
encouraging good behavior.87  Without judges and arbitrators requiring 
disclosure of funding arrangements to the decision maker, however, 
courts and arbitral tribunals will not have the tools needed to identify and 
observe cases involving third-party funding to see whether the observed 
problems are widespread or isolated. 
Fifth, writing an effective Federal Rule or rule of arbitration likely 
requires coming up with a definition of “third-party funding” or “third-
party funder,” which has proved to be incredibly difficult.88  An example 
of a recent attempt to define “third-party funder” can be found in the 
revised International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration, addressing arbitrator conflicts of 
interest.89  The explanation to one of the Guidelines states that a third-
party funder “may have a direct economic interest in the award…” and 
would be “any person or entity that is contributing funds, or other 
material support, to the prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that 
has a direct economic interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the 
award to be rendered in the arbitration.”90  This definition was coined in 
the context of international arbitration, but it is relevant to litigation as 
well.   
 87  Cf. Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called 
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but 
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the 
feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of 
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and 
before which even well settled principles of law will bend.”); Winterbottom v. 
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng.Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (“This is one of those 
unfortunate cases … in which, it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be 
without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard 
cases, it has frequently been observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”). 
 88  See infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 89  See International Bar Association, Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration, (Nov. 28, 2014) (including references to third-party 
funding as a “direct economic interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration” 
in General Standards 6 and 7; the Explanations to General Standards 6 and 7; the 
Non-Waivable Red List § 1.2; the Waivable Red List § 2.2.3; the Orange List §§ 
3.2.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4) available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.
aspx  [hereinafter “IBA Guidelines”]. 
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On the contrary, a definition of “third-party funding” or “third-party 
funder” may not be required in order to write an effective rule to address 
this phenomenon.  For example, the U.S. constitutional "obscenity” test 
could be said to take a “know it when you see it” approach, which is likely 
appropriate for third-party funding as well.91  Such a test would be easy 
to apply, because parties know when they are funded and funders know 
when they are funding, regardless of the structure of the arrangement.  
Thus, the rules could direct parties to disclose the existence of their 
funding arrangement without having to define “third-party funding” or 
“third-party funder” in the rules.  For example, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) 
already requires disclosure of the defendant’s insurance arrangement 
where the insurer is potentially liable for paying for the judgment.92   Yet, 
the Federal Rules do not define the word “insurance,” rightfully 
presuming that defendants know whether they are insured.93  Similarly, 
Rule 26(b)(3)(A) limits disclosure of trial preparation documents and 
protects documents prepared by other representatives or entities assisting 
a party such as a “consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent” 
without defining any of those terms.94  This approach has proved 
successful.  Thus, effective rules revisions may not require defining 
"third-party funder" or "third-party funding.”  However, this question 
need not be answered definitively at this time, since rule revisions will 
not take place in the near future. 
On balance, the Advisory Committee and arbitral institutions are 
probably correct to refrain from changing procedural rules while third-
party funding is still growing and developing.  It is better for judges and 
arbitrators to use their inherent powers to deal with the practice on an ad 
hoc basis unless or until systematic problems give rise to a need to address 
third-party funding directly in the procedural rules.95   
 91 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“But even those members of this Court who had created the new and changing 
standards of ‘obscenity’ could not agree on their application. And so we adopted a 
per curiam treatment of so-called obscene publications that seemed to pass 
constitutional muster under the several constitutional tests which had been 
formulated. Some condemn it if its ‘dominant tendency might be to “deprave or 
corrupt” a reader.’ Others look not to the content of the book but to whether it is 
advertised ‘to appeal to the erotic interests of customers.’ Some condemn only 
‘hardcore pornography’; but even then a true definition is lacking. It has indeed been 
said of that definition, ‘I could never succeed in (defining it) intelligibly,’ but ‘I 
know it when I see it.’”) (internal footnotes and citations omitted). 
 92  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 93  Id. 
 94  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
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V.  THE SOLUTION:  PROPOSED RULE REINTERPRETATIONS IN LIGHT 
OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDING 
This Part answers the call of the Advisory Committee to give 
guidance to judges regarding how to interpret and administer the Federal 
Rules of Civil procedure when they encounter third-party funding in a 
case.96  This Part also incorporates guidance to arbitrators regarding how 
to handle third-party funding, since, as mentioned earlier, rules of 
arbitration procedure will likely not be revised any time soon either.97  
This Part addresses litigation and arbitration together for several 
reasons.  First, at its foundation, arbitration is a quasi-judicial process; 
rules of litigation have informed the development and interpretation of 
rules of arbitration worldwide.98  Second, arbitration relies on courts to 
perform many essential procedural functions either that arbitrators do not 
have the power to perform or that the parties choose to have the court 
perform instead, such as issuing subpoenas, attaching assets, issuing 
injunctions, enforcing an arbitration agreement, and recognizing or 
enforcing arbitral awards.99  Thus, the two processes are never 
completely separate and dovetail at the enforcement stage, as discussed 
in Part V.D.  Third, arbitration borrows privilege rules from litigation 
 96  See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
 97  See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
 98  See e.g., Eric E. Bergsten, Module 5.1: International Commercial Arbitration:  
Overview, in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 19 (2005), 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add38_en.pdf (“Most societies developed at 
an early date systems [sic] of ‘arbitration’ for the settlement of disputes. Disputes 
between private parties that are settled by arbitration might be of a family nature, 
concern labor relations or be between two commercial enterprises. In the past such 
disputes were almost exclusively domestic and the systems of arbitration that 
developed reflected the nature of the particular society. It is no surprise, therefore, 
to find vast differences between domestic arbitration in Continental Europe, Latin 
America, Islamic countries, the United States and China. In some countries, 
particularly in Latin America and in England, arbitration was traditionally seen as 
an extension of the State system of litigation. In such an atmosphere the procedure 
followed in arbitration was necessarily closely modelled on the procedure followed 
in litigation in the courts. Even where arbitration was not seen as an extension of the 
State system of litigation, and the law did not require the local court procedure to be 
followed in arbitration, the habits developed by lawyers in the courts were carried 
over into arbitration.”). 
 99  See Shannon (2015), supra note 29, at 126-27 (describing the various essential 
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rules either from the seat of arbitration or chosen by the parties; there are 
no separate privilege rules for arbitration.100  Fourth, both judges and 
arbitrators need disclosure from the funded party in order to carry out 
their duties with respect to handling conflicts of interests as they relate to 
third-party funding.101  Fifth, many procedural devices that may be 
affected by third-party funding are used in both litigation and arbitration, 
such as class actions, cost sanctions, and attorney fee shifting.102  Finally, 
courts enforce both judgments and arbitration awards; arbitrators and 
arbitral institutions have no power to enforce the awards they issue.103  
For the foregoing reasons, this Part provides a pragmatic set of 
reinterpretations of the existing rules of litigation and arbitration 
procedure regarding discovery, disclosures, privileges, conflicts of 
interest, cost allocation, sanctions, class actions, and enforcement in light 
of the third-party funding phenomenon. 
A.  Judging Discovery, Disclosures, and Privileges  
1.  Litigation: Initial Disclosures, Pretrial Conferences, and Evidentiary 
Privileges  
The overarching theme of all calls to regulate third-party funding is 
disclosure.  However, many more questions are raised by the call to 
disclose than are answered.  When must information be disclosed?  To 
whom must this information be disclosed:  the decision maker or the 
opposing side?  What information should be disclosed:  the identity of the 
funder, a summary of the terms of the funding agreement, or the actual 
text of the agreement?  Should evidentiary privileges extend to privileged 
information that parties disclose to funders or to work product created 
by funders?  This Section attempts to answer these questions by 
reinterpreting Rule 26, Rule 16, and privileges under U.S. common law.   
The purpose of Rule 26 is to guide the parties through the process of 
 100  See generally Klaus Peter Berger, Evidentiary Privileges: Best Practice 
Standards versus/ and Arbitral Discretion, 22 ARB. INT’L 501 (2006); Richard M. 
Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary Privileges in International Arbitration, 50  
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 345 (2001); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: 
Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998).  See also infra Part V.A. 
 101  See infra Part V.B. 
 102  See infra Part V.C. 
 103  See infra note 242 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.D regarding 
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discovery and disclosure.104  Rule 26(f) also instructs the parties to agree 
on a discovery plan during a pretrial conference separate from the 
conference required by Rule 16, although both conferences together may 
result in a joint plan for discovery and scheduling.105  Rule 26(b)(1) limits 
discovery to any "nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's 
claim or defense."106  Rule 26 does not define the term "relevant," but the 
Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 26 state that 
the focus of discovery should be the actual claims and defenses in the 
action, and that discovery should not be used to develop new claims or 
defenses not already pled.107  In light of this, the existence or terms of the 
funding arrangement would not be relevant or material to any of the pled 
claims and defenses relating to the merits of the case.108  Funders are also 
not witnesses or experts subject to disclosure, as they will not testify at 
trial and are not employed as experts by the parties.109  Thus, third-party 
funding ordinarily would not be subject to general discovery or initial 
disclosure under Rule 26.110   
A potential exception is found in Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), which 
requires a party in discovery to disclose any insurance agreement where 
the insurer is potentially liable for paying for or reimbursing the insured 
party for all or part of the judgment.111  A court will likely view a funder 
that agrees to pay the underlying judgment (not just costs and attorneys’ 
fees) as an insurer, which would subject the funding arrangement to this 
Rule.112  This rule already applies to funding arrangements that cover the 
underlying the liability, without the need for revisions.  However, in the 
 104  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 105  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(f); see supra note 139 (regarding the FED R. CIV. P. 16 
pretrial conference). 
 106  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  A proposed revision to FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) 
would include a proportionality element, but would not change the effect on third-
party funding because the phrase “the parties’ resources” would remain in the rule.  
See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at 79-93, 
(discussing proposed revisions to Rule 26), 97-105 (presenting actual markup of 
revisions to Rule 26). 
 107  See 2000 Advisory Committee Note to FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 108  This is separate from the party disclosing this identity of the funder to the 
judge, in camera, under the proposed revisions to FED R. CIV. P. 7.1 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455.  See infra Part V.B.1. 
 109  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(A) (regarding witnesses that must be disclosed) 
and FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) (regarding experts that must be disclosed). 
 110  See Advisory Committee Note to FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that the 
parties cannot use discovery to develop new claims or defenses). 
 111  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
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vast majority of funding arrangements, the funder does not agree to pay 
the underlying liability.  Thus, this rule is inapplicable to the vast majority 
of third-party funding arrangements. 
Similarly, while the funding arrangement need not be disclosed or 
discoverable, the participation of a funder may be relevant to a court 
assessing "the parties' resources" when determining whether to limit the 
frequency and extent of discovery.113  A judge could require the funded 
party to disclose the identity of the funder to the judge by reinterpreting 
Rule 7.1 or through implementing a local rule requiring such disclosure 
under Rule 83, so that the judge would know that the funder is 
participating.114  The participation of the funder may indicate that the 
party has more "resources" for litigation costs – including discovery – 
than its personal financial status may suggest.  Alternatively, if the term 
"resources" is not construed to include sources of third-party funding, 
then Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) should be construed to include third-party 
funding.115 
The portion of the Advisory Committee’s report quoted in the 
introduction explained that the Advisory Committee declined to pursue 
further a formal proposal to amend Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) to require 
disclosure of third-party funding arrangements to the opposing party for 
inspection and copying.116  Fed. R. Civ P. 26(a)(1)(A) governs initial 
disclosures that parties must make to one another at the outset of their 
dispute.117  The amendment does not align with purpose and goals of Rule 
26 and may lead to satellite litigation.118  The first three required initial 
 113  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); cf. Letter from the U.S. Chamber Institute 
for Legal Reform et al., to the Secretary of the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, RE: Proposed Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (Apr. 9, 2014), 
at 4-5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/cv-
suggestions-2014/14-CV-B-suggestion.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter 
Letter] (discussing the potential for cost-shifting for “complex discovery disputes” 
if a third-party funder is involved). 
 114  See supra note 82 and accompanying text; infra Part V.B.1. 
 115  For example, FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) could be revised to say “the 
parties’ resources (including third-party funding).” 
 116  See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Letter, supra note 113, at 8. 
 117  See generally FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A) (outlining initial required disclosures 
that parties must make). 
 118  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), Committee Notes (2000 Amendments) 
(“Purposes of amendments. The Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosure provisions are 
amended to establish a nationally uniform practice. The scope of the disclosure 
obligation is narrowed to cover only information that the disclosing party may use 
to support its position. In addition, the rule exempts specified categories of 
proceedings from initial disclosure, and permits a party who contends that disclosure 
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disclosures listed under the existing rule all relate to witnesses or 
evidence that will be presented at trial, and the fourth required initial 
disclosure addresses insurance agreements that may be used to satisfy, 
indemnify, or reimburse all or part of the monetary judgment.119  The 
funding agreement does not relate to witnesses or evidence that will be 
presented at trial, and the vast majority of non-party litigation funders do 
not agree to pay the underlying judgment.120 In addition, as mentioned 
above, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the terms of the funding 
arrangement are not "relevant to any party's claim or defense," nor would 
disclosure of the terms of the funding agreement "lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence."121  Thus, this proposed amendment falls outside 
the purpose and goals of Rule 26, as a whole.122  Furthermore, such an 
amendment would likely lead to satellite litigation over the terms of the 
funding arrangement or to the parties comparing and contrasting the 
terms of their funding arrangements, if both sides are funded in the 
court, which must then determine whether disclosure should be made.”) (emphasis 
added); infra note 123 (listing sources discussing the dangers of satellite litigation 
over the funding arrangement). 
 119  See FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring disclosure of “the name …, 
address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable 
information … that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or 
defenses…”); FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring disclosure of “a copy … of 
all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the 
disclosing party … may use to support its claims or defenses...”); FED. R. CIV P. 
26(a)(1)(A)(iii) (“a computation of each category of damages claimed by the 
disclosing party” and “the documents or other evidentiary material … on which each 
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries 
suffered”); FED. R. CIV P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) (requiring disclosure of “any insurance 
agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or party of 
a  possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made 
to satisfy the judgment.”). 
 120  If the funder has purchased an assignment of the claim or liability, then the 
funder has agreed to pay the underlying judgment (if any) and would be named as a 
party to the case.  Most funders are not parties, however, and do not agree to pay the 
underlying judgment, even on the defense side.  See Steinitz, infra note 9, at 1275-
1276 (2011); NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 5-6.  This is different 
from a liability insurance arrangement in which the insurer does agree to pay the 
judgment.  If a third-party funder does agree to pay the underlying judgment, then 
that arrangement would be subject to disclosure under the existing FED. R. CIV P. 
26(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 121  See FED. R. CIV P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense….  Relevant 
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
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case.123  In sum, the proposed amendment was not the right solution and 
may distract the parties from pursuing the merits of their underlying 
dispute.  Nevertheless, the authors of the letter have identified an 
important problem, namely that the decision maker needs to know about 
the participation of the third-party funder in the case, which is addressed 
in Part V.B, below. 
Rule 26 also addresses privileges, which are another source of 
uncertainty in the rules of procedure with respect to third-party funding.  
The main privileges that would protect a party's documents and 
information in federal court would be the attorney-client privilege and the 
work-product doctrine.124  Both privileges are subject to wavier by 
disclosure of the document or information to a third party, unless an 
exception to waiver applies.125  The exceptions to waiver listed Federal 
 123  See, e.g., William Akel et. al., Litigation funding, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a08905f5-f923-4fc8-ba98-
dc9bdf8efe23 (Oct. 12., 2014) (“Strategically minded defendants are also interested 
in knowing about the plaintiffs’ funding arrangements, so as to be able to undermine 
them and potentially defeat even meritorious claims through satellite litigation.”); 
Law Council of Australia, Regulation of third party litigation funding in Australia: 
Position Paper, 3, http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-
docs/RegulationofthirdpartylitigationfundinginAustralia.pdf (Jun. 2011) (“The 
purpose of the paper was to set out areas in which regulation may be required for 
consumer protection, to minimise [sic] conflicts of interest and put an end to 
expensive satellite litigation over the propriety of litigation funding agreements.”); 
Atherton Godfrey Solicitors, Satellite Litigation, 
http://www.athertongodfrey.co.uk/satellite-litigation (“Satellite litigation can take 
up more than an ‘appropriate share of the Court’s resources’, tends not to help with 
either expedition or the saving of expense and perhaps more than anything leads to 
disproportionality.  Recent years have seen many of the issues arising from the last 
significant procedural and funding reforms gradually resolved, though not without 
much satellite litigation on the way. It would be regrettable if further proposed 
changes lead to a similar period of uncertainty, cost and delay.”). 
 124  See FED R. EVID. 502(g) (defining “attorney-client privilege” and “work-
product protection”).  Other privileges – such as the doctor-patient, priest-penitent, 
and accountant-client privileges – would not apply to third-party funding.  Also, note 
that FED R. EVID. 502 applies in diversity cases and in state courts. See FED R. EVID. 
502(f). 
 125  See FED R. EVID. 502 (stating that the exceptions to waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and the work-product doctrine are: disclosure in a separate federal 
proceeding [502(a)], disclosure to a federal office or agency [502(a)], inadvertent 
disclosure [502(b)], disclosure in a separate state proceeding [502(c)], a court order 
stating that the privilege is not waived [502(d)]; an agreement among the parties 
stating that the effect of disclosure is not waiver of the privilege [502(e)]).  Also, 
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Rule of Evidence 502 generally do not apply to third-party funding.126   
In order to determine whether to fund a case, funders may require 
parties to share information about their case that may be privileged under 
applicable law.127  There is currently no rule including the funder within 
the exceptions to waiver; thus, a party's privileged documents or 
information may become discoverable by the opposing party after the 
funded party discloses such documents or information to the funder.128  
At least one federal district court has stated that a preexisting 
confidentiality agreement between the funder and the funded party may 
protect the disclosed information under the work-product doctrine, but 
not the attorney-client privilege.129 In the absence of a clear rule, 
however, parties may be wary about seeking funding for fear that they 
will waive their privileges by sharing information with the funder.  
The attorney-client privilege derives from sources other than the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.130  Thus, state legislatures or state 
supreme courts would have to amend the exceptions to waiver of the 
common law attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine to 
extend to disclosures made to the funder.  This solution would increase 
the security of confidential information that the party must share with the 
funder in order to obtain funding and prevent penalizing a party seeking 
funding by protecting against the potential waiver of its evidentiary 
privileges.  In the interim, under Rules 16 and 26(f), parties can discuss 
and make an agreement regarding the applicability of evidentiary 
privileges to information disclosed to the funder.131  The parties should 
also strongly consider asking the judge to memorialize their agreement in 
a court order.132 
Although the privileges and protections for the funded party's 
documents and information are presently unclear, Rule 26 already 
protects documents and information prepared by the funder.133  Rule 
 126  Id. 
 127  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 1052, at 4-11. 
 128  See infra note 129. 
 129  See generally Miller UK Ltd. and Miller International Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
17 F.Supp.3d 711 (N.D.Il. 2014), (addressing attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine in the context of a party seeking third-party funding). 
 130  See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that federal common law governs privileges in 
federal court, unless the Constitution, a federal statute or the Supreme Court 
provides otherwise; in diversity cases, “for which state law supplies the rule of 
decision,” state law governs privileges in federal court; Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not govern privileges in those cases). 
 131  See FED R. CIV. P. 16; FED R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 132  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D). 
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26(b)(3)(A) prohibits discovery of “documents and tangible things that 
are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party 
or its representatives,” except in exigent circumstances.134  Furthermore, 
the rule states that the term "representatives" includes a “consultant, 
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent.”135  A funder surely falls within one 
or more of these categories.  Rule 26(b)(3)(B) protects the 
representatives’ “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories.”136  Thus, the funder's documents and information with respect 
to a potential or current funded party would be already protected under 
the existing rule.137 The existing protections for the funder's trial 
preparation materials also bolster the idea that the exceptions to waiver 
of the common law attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine 
should be amended to extend to disclosures made to the funder. 
Despite the unclear status of evidentiary privileges for documents 
disclosed to funders, the parties can make an enforceable agreement 
during their pretrial conference regarding how such information will be 
handled in their case.138  Rule 16 gives the court the authority to order the 
parties to hold a pre-trial conference to work out many issues, including 
disclosures, scheduling, and other issues before trial.139  Many local court 
rules explicitly require the parties to participate in this pretrial 
conference.  Rule 16 further stipulates, among other things, that parties 
may make an agreement to modify the extent of discovery,140 honor 
claims of privilege over documents or protection over trial preparation 
materials,141 and handle "other appropriate matters" as they agree.142  In 
addition, courts may "consider and take action" on "facilitating in other 
ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action."143  
Courts may also impose sanctions under Rule 16(f)(1)(C) against a party 
or a party's attorney (but not a funder) for "fail[ure] to obey a scheduling 
or other pretrial order.”  This is reasonable, because the funder does not 
appear or present documents or testimony in the case.  
Under the existing Rule 16, the parties can make an agreement 
regarding how the disclosure of the funding arrangement will be handled 
 134  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
 135  Id. 
 136  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B). 
 137  See supra note 129 and 133. 
 138  See FED R. CIV. P. 16; See FED R. CIV. P. 26. 
 139  See FED R. CIV. P. 16(a) (“the court may order the attorneys and any 
unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences”). 
 140  See FED R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
 141  See FED R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv). 
 142  See FED R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(vi). 
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and whether documents shared with or prepared by funders would be 
protected under the attorney-client privileges and the work product 
doctrine.144  Such an agreement may be memorialized in a discovery plan 
under Rule 26(f)(3).145  The parties are most likely willing to make such 
an agreement when funders back both sides.  If the agreement is 
memorialized in a scheduling order, then the party or the party's attorney 
could be sanctioned by the court for noncompliance.146  While the 
existing wording of Rule 16 provides a catch-all that would cover third-
party funding,147 it would be clearer to add language referencing funding 
to list under Rule 16(b)(3)(B) ("permitted contents of a scheduling 
order") and the list under Rule 16(c)(2) ("matters for consideration at a 
pretrial conference").  Even without rule revisions, the existing language 
of Rule 16, in combination with local court rules, will suffice.  If the 
parties make no agreement under Rule 16 regarding the treatment of 
documents disclosed to and prepared by the funder, then the default 
position for federal courts regarding those documents should be that they 
are privileged in the absence of an express waiver by the funded party. 
2.  Arbitration: Evidentiary Disclosures and Privileges 
Currently no rules of arbitration require disclosure of the 
participation of a third-party funder to the opposing party as a matter of 
general evidentiary disclosure.  The arbitrators, in consultation with the 
parties and in compliance with the arbitration clause, govern all rules of 
evidentiary disclosure and privileges in each individual arbitration 
proceeding.148  The arbitrators determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
 144  See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at 91 
(discussing additions to Rule 16(b)(3):  “The proposal also adds two subjects to the 
list of contents permitted in a scheduling order: the preservation of ESI, and 
agreements reached under Evidence Rule 502. Parallel provisions are added to the 
subjects for discussion at the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference.”); 96-97 (presenting the 
markup of the revisions to Rule 16 and the Committee Notes, which state “The 
[scheduling] order also may include agreements incorporated in a court order under 
Evidence Rule 502 controlling the effects of disclosure of information covered by 
attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, a topic also added to the 
provisions of a discovery plan under Rule 26(f)(3)(D).”). 
 145  See supra note 144. 
 146  See FED R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1)(C). 
 147  See supra note 142. 
 148  See, e.g., London Court of International Arbitration, LCIA Arbitration Rules, 
Art. 22.1(vi) (2014), http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-
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privileged information disclosed to a third-party funder is admissible and 
whether the disclosure waived any applicable evidentiary privileges.149  
Creating an arbitration rule regarding the effect of third-party funding on 
the waiver of evidentiary privileges would infringe on the parties’ right 
to choose an evidentiary regime in which disclosure to a third-party 
funder either waives or does not waive an applicable evidentiary 
privilege.  Thus, creating such a rule would be unwise and may even 
violate the parties’ freedom to choose – if they wish to do so – the 
evidentiary rules that will apply to their arbitration proceedings. 
 
decide whether or not to apply any strict rules of evidence (or any other rules) as to 
the admissibility, relevance or weight of any material tendered by a party on any 
issue of fact or expert opinion; and to decide the time, manner and form in which 
such material should be exchanged between the parties and presented to the Arbitral 
Tribunal”); International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Dispute 
Resolution Procedures, Art. 20(6) (2014), 
https://www.icdr.org/icdr/faces/i_search/i_rule/i_rule_detail?_afrWindowId=exo0
mv9ra_68&_afrLoop=1768552008878792&doc=ADRSTAGE2025301&_afrWind
owMode=0&_adf.ctrl-state=exo0mv9ra_71 [hereinafter ICDR Rules] (“The 
tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the 
evidence.”); ICDR Rules, Art. 22 (“The arbitral tribunal shall take into account 
applicable principles of privilege, such as those involving the confidentiality of 
communications between a lawyer and client. When the parties, their counsel, or 
their documents would be subject under applicable law to different rules, the tribunal 
should, to the extent possible, apply the same rule to all parties, giving preference to 
the rule that provides the highest level of protection.”); Hong Kong International 
Arbitration Centre, Administered Arbitration Rules, Art. 22.2 (2013), 
http://www.hkiac.org/en/arbitration/arbitration-rules-guidelines/hkiac-
administered-arbitration-rules-2013 [hereinafter HKIAC Rules] (“The arbitral 
tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the 
evidence, including whether to apply strict rules of evidence.”); Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre, Art. 16.2 (2013), http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-
rules-2013 [hereinafter SIAC Rules] (“The Tribunal shall determine the relevance, 
materiality and admissibility of all evidence. Evidence need not be admissible in 
law.”); SIAC Rules, Art. 24(p) (arbitral tribunal has the power to “determine any 
claim of legal or other privilege”); Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce, 2010 Arbitration Rules, Art. 26(1) (2010), 
http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/40120/arbitrationrules_eng_webbversion.pdf 
[hereinafter SCC Rules] (“The admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of 
evidence shall be for the Arbitral Tribunal to determine.”); SCC Rules, Art. 26(3) 
(tribunal may order the production of evidence relevant to the outcome of the case, 
which would usually not be the third-party funding agreement). 
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B.  Judging Conflicts of Interest of the Decision Maker 
1.  Litigation:  Corporate Party Disclosure Statements to Judges 
In order for a judge to check for financial conflicts of interest, the 
parties must disclose to the judge their relevant corporate relationships.150  
Rule 7.1 requires that corporate parties make disclosures regarding their 
corporate ownership in order to assist judges in determining whether they 
may have a potential conflict of interest mandating disqualification under 
28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.151  
Rule 7.1 was modeled after Appellate Procedure Rule 26.1.152  The 
purpose of both rules is to provide financial disclosures to facilitate 
judicial recusal decisions in circumstances where automatic financial 
interest disqualification is required under 28 U.S.C. § 455.153  
The influence of third-party funders raises similar concerns as 
corporate influence, as both types of non-party entities may attempt to 
exert similar amounts of control over the proceedings.  Therefore, the 
purpose of the disclosure statement applies to third-party funders, 
especially funders organized as corporations.  The timing of the corporate 
disclosure – at the party's first contact with the court, in person or in 
writing – is the appropriate timing for disclosing the identity of the third-
party funder as well.154  In addition, parties must "promptly" file a 
supplemental disclosure if circumstances change, which would be 
appropriate in the context of a third-party funder beginning to fund a 
pending case or withdrawing from funding a case.155  Furthermore, courts 
have applied wide-ranging sanctions when a party persistently does not 
file the disclosure statement, even after the court has directly requested 
the party to file the disclosure.156  The threat of sanctions ensures that 
 150  See FED. R. APP. P. 26.1, Advisory Committee Notes (1989 addition); 28 
U.S.C. § 455; Code of Conduct for United States Judges at Canon 3C(1)(c).  
 151  Id. 
 152  FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1, Advisory Committee Notes (2002 Adoption). 
 153  Id. 
 154  See FED R. CIV. P. 7.1(b)(1) (“[must] file the disclosure statement with its first 
appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response or other request addressed to the 
court”). 
 155  See FED R. CIV. P. 7.1(b)(2) (“[must] promptly file a supplemental statement 
if any required information changes.”). 
 156  See, e.g., American Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Lawson Bros. Trucking Co., 2008 WL 
4899425, at *1 (S.D.Ill. 2008) (holding attorney-of-record in contempt and directly 
a $100 per day fine to accrue against the attorney until the disclosure statement was 
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parties will make the required corporate and third-party funding 
disclosures. 
The Advisory Committee referenced Rule 7.1 in its December 2014 
report when rejecting the aforementioned proposal to revise Rule 26.157  
The Advisory Committee’s statement supports this article’s assertion that 
Rule 7.1 would be the appropriate Federal Rule in which to require that 
parties supported by third-party funding must disclose to the judge the 
identity of litigation funder.158  Rule 7.1 explicitly orders corporate 
parties to file a disclosure statement, so, until revisions are accomplished, 
a local court rule should be implemented to include all parties, including 
are natural persons or unincorporated associations for the purpose of 
checking conflicts of interest relating to third-party funders.159  The 
purpose would be to notify the judge of the participation of the funder so 
that he or she may determine if any conflicts of interest exist.160   
The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 7.1 suggest that 
the disclosure is intended to be very limited—only enough to notify the 
judge as to whether financial conflicts exist.161  This disclosure will be 
particularly crucial if consumer investment portfolios – such as pensions 
and mutual funds – begin to include third-party funding as an alternative 
investment source.162  Such consumer investment in litigation is already 
19, 2013); Medmarc Cas. Ins.Co. v. Sterling & Dowling PC, 2010 WL 3747754, at 
*1 (S.D.Ill. Sept. 20, 2010) (threatening non-compliant party with dismissal of the 
case); Hanratty v. Watson, 2010 WL 3522996, at *1 (S.D.Ill. Sept. 2, 2010) 
(threatening party with striking appearance and jury demand); Feezor v. Big 5 Corp., 
2010 WL 308751, at *1-*3 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (imposing modest monetary 
sanction on non-disclosing defendant). 
 157  See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 3 (“[Disclosure] will protect 
against unknown conflicts of interest by ensuring judges have access to information, 
not provided by Rule 7.1 disclosures, identifying third-party financing entities in 
which the judge may have an interest.”).   
 158  Cf id.; see also U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Stopping the Sale on 
Lawsuits:  A Proposal to Regulate Third-Party Investments in Litigation (Oct. 2012),  
at 14, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf 
(suggesting that FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1 be revised to require parties to disclose third-
party funding to the judge). 
 159  See FED R. CIV. P 7.1(a) (currently mandating that “[a] nongovernmental 
corporate party” must file a disclosure statement; not referencing any other type of 
parties, such as natural persons or unincorporated associations). 
 160  See supra note 61. 
 161  See Connelly v. Bender, 36 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1941). 
 162  If all judges in a particular jurisdiction would be disqualified on the basis of 
their consumer or retirement investments having a connection to the funder, then the 
“rule of necessity” would intervene to allow a conflicted judge to hear the case to 
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possible under Title II and Title III of the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act, which allow individuals to make equity investments 
in startups, which can include financing litigation.163  For example, there 
is already one litigation funding company brokering third-party funding 
arrangements under Title II of the JOBS Act between high-net worth 
individual investors and plaintiffs who have already filed their cases.164  
Such high-net worth individual investors could be anyone – including 
judges, attorneys, or jurors.165  
Rule 7.1 does not state whether the disclosure statement must be 
200, 213 (1980) (“However, in the highly unusual setting of these cases, even with 
the authority to assign other federal judges to sit temporarily under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
291–296 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), it is not possible to convene a division of the Court 
of Appeals with judges who are not subject to the disqualification provisions of [28 
U.S.C.] § 455. It was precisely considerations of this kind that gave rise to the Rule 
of Necessity, a well–settled principle at common law that, as Pollack put it, 
“although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a 
case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the 
case cannot be heard otherwise.” F. Pollack, A First Book of Jurisprudence 270 (6th 
ed. 1929).”) (quotation marks and citations in original).  Furthermore, potential 
jurors may also have a connection to the funder through their consumer or retirement 
investments as well as their potential status as a former funded litigant. See, e.g., 
Letter, supra note 113, at 2-3 (stating that individual jurors may be shareholders of 
a funder). A judge who has been notified regarding the participation of the funder 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1 can then determine whether it would be appropriate to 
question the jurors under FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a) regarding their potential connections 
to third-party funders. See FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a) (authorizing “the court … to 
examine prospective jurors … itself”). 
 163  See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. 112-106, Apr. 5, 
2012, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§§77-78, 7213, 7262); see generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding:  A 
Market for Lemons?, (Dec. 17. 2014 draft), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2539786. 
 164 See LexShares, How does the JOBS Act impact LexShares?, 
https://lexshares.desk.com/customer/portal/articles/1543554-how-does-the-jobs-
act-impact-lexshares- (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (“The interests offered for sale 
through LexShares rely upon an exemption under Rule 506(c) enabled by Title II of 
the JOBS Act which went effective on September 23, 2013.  This exemption permits 
an issuer to engage in general solicitation or general advertising of the offering and 
selling of securities pursuant to Rule 506, provided that (1) all purchasers of the 
securities are accredited investors and (2) the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify 
that such purchasers are accredited investors.”) 
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served on the opposing party.166  On one hand, at least one court has ruled 
that Rule 7.1 does not require serving the disclosure statement on the 
opposing party.167  On the other hand, at least one observer of the industry 
has proposed amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include a 
requirement that funding relationships be disclosed to the opposing 
party.168  The argument that funding should be disclosed to the other side 
rests on the assumption that a secretly funded party may have a tactical 
advantage in the litigation.169  This is not a compelling reason, however, 
for disclosing funding to the other side.  Parties have all sorts of tactical 
advantages in litigation for which disclosure to the other side is not 
required simply in the name of leveling the playing field.  The source of 
funding – whether from a third-party funder or otherwise – is not 
discoverable information, because the participation of the funder is not 
relevant or material to the merits of the case.170  Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) is 
the sole exception, requiring a defendant to disclose its liability 
insurance.171  The rule contemplates insurers who would pay the 
underlying judgment if the defendant loses.172  In most instances, 
however, defense-side third-party funding would not be discoverable 
under this rule, because the vast majority of funders that fund defendants 
only fund legal expenses and costs, not the underlying judgment against 
a losing defendant.  In the rare instance in which a funder does agree to 
pay the underlying judgment, then the funding arrangement would rightly 
be classified as liability insurance and subject to disclosure under Rule 
26(a)(1)(A)(iv).173  Nevertheless, this interpretation would not require 
any change to the existing federal rule on disclosing the defendant’s 
liability insurance, nor would it require disclosure of other types of 
funding arrangements to the opposing side. 
In sum, the disclosure under the amended Rule 7.1 should be limited 
to disclosure, in camera, of the identity of the funder to the judge only, 
not to the other side, at the same time as the party's first appearance in or 
communication with the court, as currently stated in the existing rule.  If 
 166  See FED R. CIV. P. 7 (discussing only the content   
(and timing of the disclosure; nothing about to whom the disclosure must or may be 
shared).  
 167  See, e.g., Plotker v. Lamberth, 2008 WL 4706255, at *12 (W.D.Va. 2008) 
(holding that service is not required because the statements are only to assist judges 
in determining whether must be disqualified from hearing the case). 
 168  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 169  Id. 
 170  See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 171 See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). 
 172 Id. 
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a funder enters or withdraws from a pending case, the party would be 
required to notify the judge of this changed circumstance under the 
existing language of Rule 7.1(b)(2).174  The judge should not share this 
information with the other party, as the existing rule does not require such 
a disclosure.175   If there is a financial conflict of interest, the judge will 
recuse himself or herself and the other side does not need to know the 
reason.176  This disclosure is enough to prevent the situation in which a 
later conflict of interest requires the judge to recuse herself or a losing 
party challenges the final judgment on the same basis.177  Yet, it is not 
enough to create a situation in which parties are required to disclose their 
funding sources to each other (except for the defendant’s liability 
insurance).178  Courts may also implement local rules requiring more 
extensive disclosures than those enumerated in Rule 7.1.179  Such local 
rules can implement these proposed reinterpretations in advance to bridge 
the gap between the existing Rule 7.1 and a potential future amendment. 
Furthermore, disclosure of the identity of the funder to the judge is 
sufficient; the actual terms of the funding arrangement need not be 
disclosed.  The purpose of the disclosure is to avoid additional costs for 
the party by identifying judicial conflicts of interest before pursuing the 
case through to a judgment that may be challenged because of 
undisclosed conflicts of interest.180  The identity of the funder is key for 
determining conflicts of interest, not the terms of the funding 
arrangement.181  At least one observer has suggested that a particularly 
unscrupulous funder could try to fund both sides of a case in order to 
hedge its investment.182  Under my proposed reinterpretation, since all 
funded parties would have a duty to disclose the identity of their funders 
to the judge, the judge would learn whether the same funder is funding 
more than one side of the case.  In that specific situation, given the 
potential for a single funder secretly to manipulate both sides of a case to 
achieve a certain outcome, the judge could rightly notify both funded 
parties regarding the identity of their common funder. 
 174  See supra note 155. 
 175  Id. 
 176  The “rule of necessity” will ensure that the case will be heard if all judges in a 
given jurisdiction or court have a relationship to the funder. See supra note 162. 
 177  See supra notes 61 and 176. 
 178  See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 179  See FED R. CIV. P. 7.1, Advisory Committee note (2002 amendments). 
 180  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 181  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 182  This observation was made by a participant at the Washington and Lee 
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2.  Arbitration:  Arbitrator Disclosure Statements to Parties  
One of the major distinctions between litigation and arbitration is 
that arbitrators go through a two-step process of nomination and 
confirmation before they see any of the documents filed in the case, 
whereas the plaintiff in litigation cannot typically vet the judge before 
filing the case with the court.  The two-step process for appointing 
arbitrators gives parties and arbitral institutions the opportunity to detect 
potentially problematic conflicts of interest before the case has gone too 
far into the merits and before the parties have spent much money on the 
case.183  The nomination and confirmation process seeks to identify 
potential independence and impartiality issues, which parties can either 
waive (in most instances) or use to disqualify the arbitrator from 
consideration for that particular case.184  A similar procedure exists to 
 183  See, e.g., Jennifer A. Trusz, Note, Full Disclosure? Conflicts of Interest 
Arising from Third-Party Funding in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 
Geo L.J. 1649, 1666-67 (2013) (discussing the procedure for disqualifying a 
potential arbitrator or challenging a sitting arbitrator under the major rules for 
international commercial arbitration). 
 184  See, e.g., International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), Arbitration Rules, Art. 11(2)-(3) (2012), 
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-
rules-of-arbitration/ [hereinafter ICC Rules] (potential arbitrator must ”disclose in 
writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature 
as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes of the parties, as 
well as any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality” and has an ongoing obligation to disclose any such 
circumstances that arise during the course of the arbitration); LCIA Rules, supra note 
148, at Art. 5.4-5.5 (potential arbitrator must disclose “any circumstances currently 
known to the candidate which are likely to give rise in the mind of any party to any 
justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence” and has an ongoing 
obligation to disclose any such circumstances that arise during the course of the 
arbitration); ICDR Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 13.2-13.3 (potential arbitrator 
must ”disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence and any other relevant facts the arbitrator 
wishes to bring to the attention of the parties” and has an ongoing obligation to 
disclose any such circumstances or facts that arise during the course of the 
arbitration); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 11.1 (“An arbitral tribunal 
confirmed under these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and 
independent of the parties.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 11.4 (potential 
arbitrator must “disclose  any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts 
as to his or her impartiality or independence” and has an ongoing obligation to 
disclose any such circumstances that arise during the course of the arbitration); SIAC 
Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 10.4-10.5 (potential arbitrator must disclose “any 
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some extent for judges when one of the parties is a corporate entity that 
must file a disclosure statement under Federal Rule 7.1.  The main 
difference is the timing; the judge is already in place at the time of the 
Rule 7.1 filing, so the appropriate course of action in the event of a 
conflict of interest would be for the judge to recuse herself.185  There is 
also a “rule of necessity,” meaning that if all judges in a 
particular jurisdiction would be disqualified from the same reason, then 
any judge can hear the case.186  
In order to cause the least disruption and cost for the parties, ideally, 
any conflicts of interest relating to the funder’s involvement should be 
addressed before the appointment of the arbitrator.187  Otherwise, the 
arbitrator may be challenged and (if the challenge is successful) replaced, 
increasing the time, cost, and inconvenience of the parties to the case.188 
Thus, the arbitrator should disclose connections, if any, that it has to the 
third-party funder in the case prior to the arbitrator’s confirmation.189  
One source of guidance regarding arbitrator disclosure obligations 
is the International Bar Association’s (IBA) revised Guidelines on 
independence as soon as reasonably practicable” and has an ongoing obligation to 
disclose any such circumstances that arise during the course of the arbitration); SCC 
Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 14(2)-(3) (potential arbitrator must disclose “any 
circumstances which may give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her impartiality or 
independence” and has an ongoing obligation to disclose any such circumstances 
that arise during the course of the arbitration). 
 185  See supra note 61. 
 186  See supra note 162. 
 187  See Trusz, supra note 183 at 1652 (“Because of the potential disruption of the 
arbitration and the possibility of annulment, nonrecognition, and non-
enforcement of the award, conflicts of interest should be addressed prior to the 
appointment of the arbitrator.”) 
 188  See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 14(1) (a sitting arbitrator may be 
challenged “for an alleged lack of impartiality or independence, or otherwise”); 
LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 10.1 (sitting arbitrator may be challenged if 
“circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to that arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence”); ICDR Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 14.1 (“A party 
may challenge an arbitrator whenever circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”); HKIAC Rules, supra 
note 148, at Art. 11.6 (“Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence...”); 
SIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 11.1 (“Any arbitrator may be challenged if 
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence...”); SCC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 15(1) (sitting 
arbitrator may be challenged “if circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence”). 
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Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, which took effect on 
November 28, 2014.190  These guidelines are not mandatory in any 
arbitration proceedings; parties or arbitrators can choose to reference 
them or ignore them altogether.  The IBA revised several of its guidelines 
to require arbitrators to disclose to parties their connections with third-
party funders in order to check for potential conflicts of interest.191  The 
IBA revised one of its guidelines to require funded parties to disclose the 
identity of their third-party funder to the arbitrator, so that the arbitrator 
may assess potential conflicts of interest.192  The explanatory statement 
to one of the guidelines defines a “third-party funder” as “any person or 
entity that is contributing funds, or other material support, to the 
prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that has a direct economic 
interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in 
the arbitration.”193 
Arbitral institutions and rules may wish to borrow or reference the 
IBA’s definition of third-party funder in the guidance that they provide 
with their instructions to arbitrators regarding disclosures pursuant to a 
nomination, so that arbitrators under their auspices will know what type 
of relationships to disclose, even if the parties have not agreed to use the 
IBA Rules.194  Similarly, the arbitrator needs to know about the 
involvement of the third-party funder in order to disclose any potential 
conflicts of interest, so arbitral institutions should require parties to 
disclose the identity of their third-party funders to their arbitrator.195  
Thus, arbitration rules should implement a corporate party disclosure rule 
similar to this article’s proposed reinterpretation of Federal Rule 7.1; such 
an arbitration rule would require a funded party to disclose the identity of 
its third-party funder to the arbitrator.196  This would enable the arbitrator 
to make the appropriate disclosures to avoid conflicts of interest.197 At 
 190  See generally IBA Guidelines, supra note 89. 
 191  See id. at General Standard 6; the Explanation to General Standard 6; the 
Waivable Red List § 2.2.3; the Orange List §§ 3.2.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.4 (requiring an 
arbitrator to disclose its connections to third-party funders, defined as entities with 
a “direct economic interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration”). 
 192  See id. at General Standard 7 (requiring a funded party to disclose its 
connection to a third-party funder, defined as an entity with a “direct economic 
interest in the award to be rendered in the arbitration”). 
 193  Id. at Explanation to General Standard 6. 
 194  Id. 
 195  See Trusz, supra note 195183, at 1655 (discussing how an arbitrator cannot 
disclose a connection with a third-party funder unless the arbitrator is made aware 
of the funder’s participation in the case). 
 196  See supra Part V.B.1. 
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least one scholar has proposed changing international arbitration rules to 
address arbitrator conflicts of interest within the 
existing institutional arbitration rules.198  
Except for mandatory disclosures relating to conflicts of interest, 
arbitrators have wide latitude to tailor the proceedings to the parties’ 
needs, which may include choosing to ignore the participation of a third-
party funder.199  For example, unlike in United States litigation, arbitral 
 198  See Trusz, supra note 195183, at 1652, 1673 (“The four-prong proposal begins 
with a duty by the arbitrator to disclose any past and current relationships with third-
party funders to the institution. Second, the arbitral rules should provide that any 
party receiving outside funding must disclose to the institution that relationship and 
any potential conflicts involving the third-party funder. Third, the arbitral rules 
should require automatic review of potential third-party funding conflicts that are 
triggered by the party’s disclosure of a funding relationship. The institution would 
be required to keep all funding information confidential. Finally, in order to 
incentivize third-party funders to disclose the relationship, the arbitral rules should 
provide that such relationships cannot be considered in tribunal decisions for awards 
on costs or security for costs. The proposal is then slightly modified to adapt to ad 
hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules.”); see also Marc J. Goldstein, 
Should the Real Parties in Interest Have To Stand Up?—Thoughts About a 
Disclosure Regime for Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration, 8 
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Oct. 2011, at 4, 8 (suggesting that institutions could 
“require parties and counsel to disclose the identity of any financer involved, 
and require arbitrator nominees to disclose to the institution the identity of any 
financers with whom they or their law firms have relationships” so that if a conflict 
of interest exists, “the institution could decline to confirm the arbitrator, without 
disclosure of the reasons to the parties”). 
 199  See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 22(1)-(2) (“The arbitral tribunal 
and the parties shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration in an 
expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to the complexity and value of 
the dispute. In order to ensure effective case management, the arbitral tribunal, after 
consulting the parties, may adopt such procedural measures as it 
considers appropriate, provided that they are not contrary to any agreement of the 
parties.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 14.4(ii) (arbitral tribunal has “a duty 
to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the arbitration, avoiding 
unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide a fair, efficient and expeditious 
means for the final resolution of the parties’ dispute.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, 
at Art. 14.5 (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall have the widest discretion to discharge 
these general duties, subject to such mandatory law(s) or rules of law as the Arbitral 
Tribunal may decide to be applicable; and at all times the parties shall do everything 
necessary in good faith for the fair, efficient and expeditious conduct of the 
arbitration, including the Arbitral Tribunal’s discharge of its general duties.”); ICDR 
Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 20.1 (“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may 
conduct the arbitration in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that 
the parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and 
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tribunals generally refrain from allowing the revelation of a third-party 
funder to sway their decision regarding awarding costs or ordering 
security for costs.200  However, if an arbitral tribunal did decide to 
consider the participation of the third-party funder, then it would have the 
power to allocate costs for or against a particular party on that basis.201 
Art. 13.5 (“The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall do everything necessary to 
ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 
148, at Art. 13.1 (“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal shall adopt suitable 
procedures for the conduct of the arbitration in order to avoid unnecessary delay or 
expense, having regard to the complexity of the issues and the amount in dispute, 
and provided that such procedures ensure equal treatment of the parties and afford 
the parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case.”); SIAC Rules, supra note 
148, at Art. 16.1 (“The Tribunal shall conduct the arbitration in such manner as it 
considers appropriate, after consulting with the parties, to ensure the fair, 
expeditious, economical and final determination of the dispute.”). 
 200  Compare Trusz supra note 1 at 1677-79 (discussing arbitral tribunals declining 
to consider the participation of a third-party funder when awarding costs or ordering 
security for costs, although some funders choose to incorporate security for costs 
into their business arrangements as a matter of good governance or cost of doing 
business) with Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So. 3d 691, 693-94 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding that the litigation funder was a “party” under Florida law for the purpose of 
allocating costs, because the funder had substantially “controlled” the litigation). 
 201  See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 37(3) (“At any time during the 
arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may make decisions on costs, other than 
those to be fixed by the Court, and order payment.”); ICC Rules, supra note 184, at 
Art. 37(5) (“In making decisions as to costs, the arbitral tribunal may take into 
account such circumstances as it considers relevant, including the extent to 
which each party has conducted the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective 
manner.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 25.1-25.2 (arbitral tribunal has the 
power “to order any respondent party to a claim or cross-claim to provide security 
for all or part of the amount in dispute, by way of deposit or bank guarantee or in 
any other manner,” to order a “cross-indemnity,” and to order “security for Legal 
Costs and Arbitration Costs”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 28.2 (“The 
Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the proportions in which the parties shall bear such 
Arbitration Costs.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 28.3 (“The Arbitral 
Tribunal shall also have the power to decide by an award that all or part of the legal 
or other expenses incurred by a party (the “Legal Costs”) be paid by another party.”) 
(parentheses and quotation marks in original); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 
28.4 (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall make its decisions on both Arbitration Costs and 
Legal Costs on the general principle that costs should reflect the parties’ relative 
success and failure in the award or arbitration or under different issues, except where 
it appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that in the circumstances the application of such 
a general principle would be inappropriate under the Arbitration Agreement or 
otherwise.”); ICDR Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 20(7) (“The arbitral tribunal may 
allocate costs, draw adverse inferences, and take such additional steps as are 
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C.  Judging Cost Allocation and Sanctions 
1.  Litigation:  Fee Shifting, Sanctions, and Class Action Litigation 
Since funders pay upfront the attorney fees, filing fees, evidentiary 
fees, and other costs of the funded party, many questions arise regarding 
how the participation of the funder should affect the allocation of costs, 
if at all.  Should the funder pay the penalty for conduct by the funded 
party or its attorney that the court sanctions under Rule 11 or Rule 37?  
Should the funder be reimbursed if the funded party would be entitled to 
reimbursement of attorney fees under Rule 54?  Should the funder of a 
successful class action receive a portion of the judicially-approved 
attorney fees under rule 23?  This Section addresses the impact of third-
party funding on fee shifting, sanctions, and class action litigation. 
Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(iv) requires that, in order for a winning party to 
recover attorney’s fees, the party must “disclose, if the court so orders, 
the terms of any agreement about fees for the services for which the claim 
supra note 148, at Art. 34 (“The arbitral tribunal shall fix the costs of arbitration in 
its award(s). The tribunal may allocate such costs among the parties if it determines 
that allocation is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case.”); 
HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 24 (“The arbitral tribunal may make an order 
requiring a party to provide security for the costs of the arbitration.”); HKIAC Rules, 
supra note 148, at Art. 33.2 (“The arbitral tribunal may apportion all or part of 
the costs of the arbitration referred to in Article 33.1 between the parties if it 
determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances 
of the case.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 33.3 (“With respect to the costs 
of legal representation and assistance ..., the arbitral tribunal, taking into account the 
circumstances of the case, may direct that the recoverable costs of the arbitration, or 
any part of the arbitration, shall be limited to a specified amount.”); SIAC Rules, 
supra note 148, at Art. 24(k)-(l) (tribunal may order a party to pay security for costs 
or security for all or part of the amount in dispute); SIAC Rules, supra note 148, at 
Art. 31.1 (“Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the Tribunal shall determine in 
the award the apportionment of the costs of the arbitration among the parties.”); 
SIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 33 (“The Tribunal shall have the authority to 
order in its award that all or a part of the legal or other costs of a party be paid by 
another party.”); SCC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 43(5) (“Unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal shall, at the request of a party, apportion the 
Costs of the Arbitration between the parties, having regard to the outcome of the 
case and other relevant circumstances.”)(emphasis added); SCC Rules, supra note 
148, at Art. 44 (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal may 
in the final award upon the request of a party, order one party to pay any reasonable 
costs incurred by another party, including costs for legal representation, having 
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is made.”202  The language "if the court so orders" highlights that judge 
must decide whether any such fee agreement must be divulged.203    Since 
the essence of the funding agreement is paying attorney's fees, the 
funding agreement is an "agreement about fees for the services for which 
the claim is made."204  Thus, a winning funded party seeking 
reimbursement for attorney fees would be required to disclose the 
existence of the funding arrangement, "if the court so orders," in order to 
recover those attorney's fees.205  Enforcement of this requirement could 
be accomplished under the existing language of Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(iv) or 
by appending the phrase "including third-party funding" to the end of the 
sentence.  Local rules may also supply specific requirements regarding 
the disclosure of the third-party funding agreement in the context of a 
claim for attorney's fees.206 
In additional to making the winning party whole, an award of 
attorney fees is commonly used to sanction a party.207  The fundamental 
question with regard to sanctions is whether a funder should be liable for 
sanctions imposed on the funded party or the funded party's attorney if 
the funder directed or condoned the sanctioned conduct.  Sanctioning the 
party or its attorneys increases the litigation costs.  Presumably, those 
costs would be borne by the funder under the terms of the funding 
arrangement, as long as the sanctioned action was within the bounds of 
the funding arrangement.208  Regardless, as currently worded, Rules 11 
and 37 likely do not reach third-party funders directly, but rather 
indirectly by punishing the funded party or its attorney and incurring 
additional costs for the funder.209 
Rule 11 sanctions misconduct relating to papers presented to or filed 
with the court.210  Rule 11(c)(1) authorizes a court to sanction attorneys, 
 202  See FED R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(iv). 
 203  Id. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id. 
 206  See FED R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2) (“By local rule, the court may establish special 
procedures to resolve re-related issues without extensive evidentiary hearings.”) 
 207  See e.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at 6 (referring to FED. R. 
CIV. P. 68, which currently provides for the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorney 
fees if the plaintiff rejects the defendant’s settlement offer and the fails to obtain a 
better judgment). 
 208  Cf. Shannon, supra note 29, at 115 n.71 and accompanying text. 
 209  Id. 
 210  See FED R. CIV. P. 11(a) (stating that if a paper is not signed, “[t]he court must 
strike any unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being 
called to the attorney’s or party’s attention); FED R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“an attorney or 
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law firms, or parties; the rule does not list any other persons.211  Rule 11 
should not be revised to apply to funders, because funders take no direct 
action in court and make no representations to the court.212  The Advisory 
Committee notes state that, in appropriate circumstances, courts may 
impose sanctions on the "person" – other than the party or attorney – 
found to be responsible for the violation of Rule 11.213  This could apply 
directly to the funder if there were proof that the funder directed the action 
or if the funder takes a very active role in the litigation.  However, the 
funder's actions would have to be directly tied to the paper or document 
in question.214  There has been at least once case in which the funder was 
so involved in the case that court treated the funder as a party for the 
purpose of allocation cost, but not for sanctions under Rule 11.215  The 
funding agreement may address payment for monetary sanctions and 
would probably govern the disposition of sanctions-related issues that 
arise between funders and funded parties.216  As such, the court may 
consider the participation of the funder if the court wishes to take into 
account the financial status of the funded party or its attorney when 
assessing monetary sanctions against them.217 
Rule 37 governs sanctions for failure to cooperate with discovery 
and belief,” the “pleading, written motion, or other paper” presented to the court 
meets the four conditions listed in the rule). 
 211  See FED R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction 
on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the 
violation.”) 
 212  The sole exception is if the funder has taken an assignment of the claim and is 
the named party in the dispute. 
 213  See FED R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendments) 
(“When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order to determine 
whether the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or parties either in 
addition to or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually making the 
presentation to the court. For example, such an inquiry may be appropriate in cases 
involving governmental agencies or other institutional parties that frequently impose 
substantial restrictions on the discretion of individual attorneys employed by it.”). 
 214  See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 215  See Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, supra note 200, at 693-94 (holding that the third-
party funder was a “party” under Florida law for allocating costs, because the funder 
had substantially “controlled” the litigation); see also Letter, supra note 113, at 6.  
The vast majority of funders are very careful not to control the litigation in order to 
avoid causing attorneys to violate rules of professional responsibility, so the Abu-
Ghazaleh is considered an outlier. 
 216  Cf. Shannon, supra note 29, at 115 n.71 and accompanying text. 
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requests.218  Rule 37 authorizes sanctions on a deponent,219 a witness, a 
party, an officer or employee of a party, or a party's attorney; the rule 
does not list any other persons.220  Thus, like Rule 11, the wording of 
Rule 37 does not contemplate sanctioning a third-party funder.  The 
funder does not participate directly in discovery, so it would be 
inappropriate to revise Rule 37 to authorize sanctioning the funder 
directly.221 If the opposing party can demonstrate that the fault lies with 
the funder – for example, if the party cannot perform certain discovery 
functions due to the funder’s refusal to pay for a particular document 
production or witness travel – it may be possible to require the funder to 
pay the party's discovery sanctions.222  However, it would likely be very 
difficult to prove that the funder is at fault and may require additional 
discovery that would needlessly increase the time and cost of the 
litigation.  As mentioned above, the funding agreement may address 
payment for monetary sanctions and would probably govern the 
disposition of sanctions-related issues that arise between funders and 
funded parties.223  
Finally, there is a potential for third-party funding to have an impact 
on class actions, although class actions are not a very attractive market 
for funders in the United States.  Rule 23 governs class action 
 218  See generally, FED R. CIV. P. 37. 
 219  A deponent is the person who is to be questioned during a deposition. 
 220  See FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(1) (sanctioning a “deponent”); FED R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2)(A) (sanctioning “a party’s officer, director or managing agent – or a witness 
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B) 
(sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (requiring “a disobedient party, 
the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) (sanctioning “a 
party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2) (sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P. 
37(d)(1)(A)(i) (sanctioning “a party or a party’s officer, director or managing agent 
– or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(f) 
(sanctioning “a party or its attorney”). 
 221  See FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(1) (sanctioning a “deponent”); FED R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2)(A) (sanctioning “a party’s officer, director or managing agent – or a witness 
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B) 
(sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (requiring “a disobedient party, 
the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) (sanctioning “a 
party”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2) (sanctioning “a party”); FED R. CIV. P. 
37(d)(1)(A)(i) (sanctioning “a party or a party’s officer, director or managing agent 
– or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)”); FED R. CIV. P. 37(f) 
(sanctioning “a party or its attorney”). 
 222  Cf. supra note 221. 
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proceedings.224 While funders in other jurisdictions frequently fund the 
class itself, funders in the United States have shied away from directly 
funding the class representative for a variety of reasons that are beyond 
the scope of this article.225  More commonly, funders back the law firm 
representing the class instead of funding the class directly.226  Given the 
extensive judicial oversight over class actions – including approving the 
class certification, the class counsel, the settlement, and the amount of 
attorney fees awarded – there is not yet a need to revise the class action 
rule to take into account third-party funding. 
Rule 23(h), in conjunction with Rule 54(d)(2)(C), govern the 
prevailing party's recovery of attorney's fees in a class action case.227  
Regardless of the structure of the arrangement, the funder has actually 
paid the litigation costs, including the attorney's fees.228   Thus, having 
the entire amount of the attorney's fees awarded to the law firm would be 
unjust enrichment under contract law.  The funder would be paid from 
the attorney’s fees awarded, so judges already, in essence, have oversight 
over the funder’s fee.  The funder should be reimbursed at least the 
amount actually spent on attorney's fees.  However, the funder's 
entitlement to payment would be founded on its contractual rights 
through the funding arrangement rather than an entitlement to receive 
reimbursement for attorney's fees under Rule 23.  Given the attorney 
ethical prohibition on fee sharing, the attorney would likely not be able 
to pay the funder directly from its judicially awarded fee.  Thus, since the 
judge already has broad oversight over the attorney's fee, the judge should 
have discretion over the amount of the fee allotted from the class award 
that would go to the funder. 
In the future, it may be appropriate to state explicitly that judges 
have oversight over the participation of funders in class action litigation.  
However, direct funding of class actions is not yet very prevalent in the 
United States, so amending Rule 23 to address the issue would be 
 224  See generally FED R. CIV. P. 23. 
 225  See e.g., NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at 74-84 (discussing funding 
of class and group actions in Australia), 120-21 (mentioning that class action 
litigation and class arbitration are nonexistent in the United States), 180-81 
(discussing funding under the “Class Action Act” in the Netherlands), 185-86 
(discussing class action funding in Canada). 
 226  For an in-depth treatment of lawyer lending, see, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, 
Re-Re-Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer Lending Might Remake the 
American Litigation Landscape, Again, 61 UCLA REV. DISC. 110 (2013); Nora 
Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 
377 (2014). 
 227  See FED R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(C) and FED R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
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premature.  Courts already have complete control over the awarding of 
attorney’s fees in the class action context.229  At present, the judge’s 
influence over the creation and maintenance of class action suits 
demonstrates that the judge would have control over relationships formed 
between class clients and their "representatives," including funders.230 
2.  Arbitration:  Cost Shifting, Security for Costs, and Class Arbitration 
The disclosure of the third-party funder typically arises in relation 
to cost allocation, either before or after the arbitration proceedings.  In 
situations in which the third-party funder is disclosed voluntarily (or 
accidentally), the opposing non-funded party sometimes then petitions 
the arbitral tribunal to order security for costs.231 Furthermore, if the non-
funded party wins, then it may request that the tribunal order payment of 
costs by the funded party or even the funder directly.232 A few 
international arbitration tribunals have ordered funders to post security 
for costs in advance of the proceedings, and some third-party funders 
view paying security for costs as a simply a cost of doing business in 
jurisdictions that follow the English (“loser pays”) cost allocation rule.233  
Some jurisdictions allow funders to be joined to cost proceedings and for 
funders to issue cost orders against funders.234 Thus, with respect to 
disclosure to the opposing party, the existing practice appears to be for 
arbitral tribunals to address the issue when allocating costs on a case-by-
case basis.  Given the trend in arbitration rules worldwide of giving 
arbitrators wide discretion in determining cost allocation, adopting a 
specific cost allocation rule addressing third-party funding would be 
counterproductive. 
Finally, class arbitration is funded in several jurisdictions worldwide 
but not in the United States for reasons beyond the scope of this paper.235  
 229  See FED R. CIV. P. Rule 23(g)(1)(D). 
 230  For the definition of “representatives,” see supra note 135 and accompanying 
text. 
 231  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at xix-xx, 4, 12-13, 23-24, 27-
28, 30, 33 n.16, 61, 74-75, 82-83 (discussing examples of how security for costs and 
adverse costs orders under the English rule of cost allocation may be addressed in 
the funding agreement). 
 232  See id. 
 233  See id. 
 234  See supra note 215. 
 235  Third-party funding of class actions is not yet prevalent in the United States, 
but the practice is widespread in other leading third-party funding jurisdictions such 
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In all the jurisdictions outside the United States in which class action 
funding is allowed, the participation of the funder is usually disclosed to 
the decision maker and the opposing side, although the terms of the 
funding agreement need not necessarily be disclosed.236  Class arbitration 
is not prevalent in the United States in light of recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence making class arbitration jurisdiction nearly impossible to 
create.237  Thus, third-party funding for class arbitrations seated in the 
United States is likely to continue to be nonexistent.   
D.  Judging Enforcement 
Enforcement is where litigation and arbitration converge, and 
successful enforcement is required for the third-party funder to receive 
any payment.  Both litigation judgments and arbitral awards are enforced 
by courts, because arbitrators do not have the power to enforce their own 
awards.238  In both litigation and arbitration, there is no requirement that 
the judgment or award reference the participation of a third-party funder, 
and there is no requirement of disclosure that the proceedings were 
funded in order for enforcement to be effective.  The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the United States Constitution requires all states to honor the 
judgments of the courts of other states.239  Thus, enforcing a funded state 
court judgment—even in another state that disallows third-party 
funding—should not be difficult.   
In arbitration, a winning party may encounter difficulties, however, 
when trying to enforce a funded arbitral award in a jurisdiction that has 
of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (2011); Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman & Alana 
Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and 
U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (2013); Michael Legg 
& Louisa Travers, Necessity is the Mother of Invention: The Adoption of Third-Party 
Litigation Funding and the Closed Class in Australian Class Actions, 38 COMMON 
L. WORLD REV. 245 (2009); Michael J. Legg, Shareholder Class Actions in 
Australia—The Perfect Storm?, 31 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 669 (2008); Ianika N. 
Tzankova, Funding of Mass Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands, 8 J.L. ECON. 
& POL’Y 549 (2012). 
 236  See supra note 225. 
 237  See e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) 
(ruling that class arbitration jurisdiction is not proper unless class arbitration is 
expressly written into all of the parties’ signed arbitration agreements, including 
every single class member). 
 238  See infra note 242. 
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express laws or a public policy against funding, but only if the enforcing 
court finds out about the funder’s involvement or that some of the 
awarded money will go to a funder.  Many jurisdictions find distasteful 
the idea that some money from the award or judgment will go to a private 
entity that became involved in the case solely for profit, even if the 
practice was legal at the procedural seat of the arbitration and under the 
applicable substantive law.240  
The New York Convention has a public policy exception by which 
an enforcing court can decline to enforce an otherwise valid arbitral 
award if the award somehow violates public policy in that court’s 
jurisdiction.241  For example, the United States has implemented the New 
York Convention domestically through Chapter 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  Notably, the FAA incorporates by reference 
key provisions of the New York Convention, such as in 28 U.S.C. § 207, 
which states that, “the court shall confirm the award unless it finds one 
of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the 
award specified in the said Convention.”242  This language refers to the 
 240 See generally, Catherine A. Rogers, Gamblers, Loan Sharks & Third-Party 
Funders, in CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
(2014); W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-
Commodification Norms, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (2014). 
 241 See, e.g., Trusz supra note 183 at 1668 (discussing the grounds for vacating an 
arbitral award under Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act due to the “partiality” 
or “corruption” of the arbitrators); Trusz supra note 183 at 1669 (discussing grounds 
for non-enforcement of an arbitral award under the New York Convention relating 
to an arbitrator’s connection to a third-party funder); United Paperworkers Int’l 
Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (“A court’s refusal to enforce 
an arbitrator’s award under [an arbitration] agreement because it is contrary to public 
policy is a specific application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common 
law, that a court may nonrefuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public 
policy.”). 
 242 See e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 207 (2012) (Federal Arbitration Act sections on 
enforcing arbitration awards).  In addition, the 1958 Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the “New York 
Convention,” is the main vehicle for enforcement of arbitration awards worldwide.  
At the time of this writing, 154 countries have signed the New York Convention.  
For a current list of signatories to the New York Convention, see Status: Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 
UNCITRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status
.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).  Third-party funding is also prevalent in investor-
state arbitration, which is typically authorized by a treaty and most often takes place 
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
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“public policy” exception found in Article V.2.b of the Convention, 
which states that the court may sua sponte deny enforcement if “the 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country [where enforcement is sought].”243 
Some jurisdictions, like Hong Kong, explicitly allow third-party 
funding in international arbitration while generally prohibiting the 
practice in domestic litigation.244 In contrast, other jurisdictions, like 
Singapore, currently prohibit third-party funding in all forums, including 
international arbitration.245 Most countries fall somewhere in between.  
The current regulatory landscape in the United States is unclear at best, 
but it appears that the laws in roughly two-thirds of the states would allow 
third-party funding in international arbitration.246  Given the limited 
grounds for vacating or setting aside an international arbitration award 
under the Federal Arbitration Act, addressing third-party funding in 
international arbitration through domestic arbitration laws would be 
unnecessary.247  As mentioned in Part V.B.2, one of those grounds for 
refusing enforcement of an arbitral award is the revelation of an 
undisclosed conflict of interest that leads to the appearance that the 
“Washington Convention,” which presently has 159 signatories.  For a current list 
of signatories to the ICSID Convention, see Member States, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-Member-
States.bak.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).   
 243 See supra note 242. 
 244 NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at 227–31 (addressing the laws on 
third-party funding in Hong Kong). 
 245 Id. at 237–38 (addressing the laws on third-party funding in Singapore); but 
see, “Review of the International Arbitration Act: Proposals for Public 
Consultation,” Ministry of Law of the Singapore Government, 
http://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/assets/documents/linkclick
f651.pdf (soliciting public comment on a proposed amendment to allow third-party 
funding in international arbitration cases over 1 million Singapore dollars, subject 
to certain restrictions and requirements). 
 246 See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 10, at 144–159 (presenting a state-
by-state survey of the laws regarding third-party funding, including all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia). 
 247 See generally, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012); New York Convention¸ infra note 242. 
For international arbitration, promulgating guidelines at the international level 
through arbitral institutions and international bar associations would most effective. 
For an example of a global effort to create such guidelines for international 
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arbitrator is biased.248  Thus, any relationship between an arbitrator and a 
third-party funder should be disclosed at the outset.249 
Given the privacy of arbitration, the author has yet to hear of an 
example of a court declining to enforce an arbitral award purely due to 
the involvement of a third-party funder, but there is a possibility that it 
may have happened in private already or that it will happen in the future.  
In addition, arbitral institutions and arbitrators have a duty to work to 
ensure the enforceability of arbitral awards to the extent that 
enforceability is within their control.250 If we have clear standards for the 
involvement of third-party funders throughout the conduct of the dispute 
resolution procedures to allay concerns regarding due process and undue 
interference, then a court will be less likely to decline to enforce a 
judgment or award in the future simply on the basis of a funder’s 
involvement. 
VI.  CONCLUSION:  JUDGING THE FUTURE OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDING 
Through the foregoing rule reinterpretations, judges and arbitrators 
will position themselves to identify and observe instances of third-party 
funding in their “natural habitat” – during the litigation or arbitration 
proceedings.  Furthermore, they will be able to observe ordinary, routine 
third-party funding instances, which will likely lead to more universal 
regulatory insights than the few outlier third-party funding instances 
revealed by accident or through a party’s settlement strategy.  Over time, 
 248  See Trusz, supra note 183, at 1652 (discussing how an undisclosed arbitrator 
conflict of interest with a funder may cause the award to be annulled or denied 
recognition or enforcement). 
 249  See IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, and accompanying text. 
 250  See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 184, at Art. 41 (“In all matters not expressly 
provided for in the Rules, the Court and the arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit 
of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable 
at law.”); LCIA Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 32.2 (“...the LCIA Court, the LCIA, 
the Registrar, the Arbitral Tribunal and each of the parties shall act at all times in 
good faith, respecting the spirit of the Arbitration Agreement, and shall make every 
reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally recognised and enforceable at 
the arbitral seat.”); HKIAC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 13.8 (“The arbitral tribunal 
shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that an award is valid.”); SIAC Rules, 
supra note 148, at Art 37.2 (“...the President, the Court, the Registrar and the 
Tribunal shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every reasonable effort 
to ensure the fair, expeditious and economical conclusion of the arbitration and the 
enforceability of any award.”); SCC Rules, supra note 148, at Art. 47 (“...the SCC, 
the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall 
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these observations will answer many of society’s pressing questions to 
reveal the true systemic impact of third-party funding.  How prevalent is 
third-party funding?  What is the effect of third-party funding on parties, 
counsel, procedures, and outcomes in dispute resolution?  What benefits 
and problems can we identify?  Are those benefits and problems different 
or the same as we predicted or surmised?  Should those benefits be 
incentivized and those problems be regulated, and if so, how?  We 
currently cannot answer these questions without more data.  Thus, the 
rule reinterpretations proposed in this article should be viewed as an 
interim regulatory structure with the goal of gleaning more data about the 
prevalence, structures, and impact of third-party funding within litigation 
and arbitration through disclosure and observation.  This data would 
inform the next step of regulation, such as correcting, tailoring, or 
revising existing rules. 
Although rule revisions are far off, this article concludes by 
providing a few suggestions for revisions for the Advisory Committee on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and arbitral institutions to consider 
in the future.  First, a working definition of a “third-party funder” and 
“third-party funding” would be very helpful.  Funders and funding take 
so many different forms, however, that proposed uniform definitions may 
be over- or under-inclusive.251 Still, defining these two terms is likely 
crucial to any comprehensive regulatory effort.  In addition, regulations 
should incorporate the same definitions of these two terms to clarify the 
type of arrangement to which all the regulations are referring.  This will 
create cohesion and uniformity within the proposed regulatory scheme.  
An example of a potentially useful definition can be found in the revised 
International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration.252 The definition states that a third-party funder 
“may have a direct economic interest in the award…” and would be “any 
person or entity that is contributing funds, or other material support, to 
the prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that has a direct economic 
 251 This comment was made during the February 12, 2014 and February 12, 2015 
meetings of the Third-Party Funding Task Force (http://www.arbitration-icca.org/
projects/Third_Party_Funding.html).The international arbitration community hopes 
to devise a set of guidelines or rules for the practice. See also IBA Guidelines, supra 
note 89 and accompanying text. 
 252  See IBA Guidelines, supra note 89, at Explanation to General Standard 6(b), 
(“Third-party funders and insurers in relation to the dispute may have a direct 
economic interest in the award, and as such may be considered to be the equivalent 
of the party. For these purposes, the terms ‘third-party funder’ and ‘insurer’ refer to 
any person or entity that is contributing funds, or other material support, to the 
prosecution or defence [sic] of the case and that has a direct economic interest in, or 
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interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award to be rendered in 
the arbitration.”253 
Second, the rules should be revised to require funded parties to make 
disclosures to the decision maker.  The funded party should be required 
to disclose to the judge or arbitrator the identity of the third-party funder, 
so that the judge or arbitrator can determine whether he or she has a 
connection to the funder that would require recusal.  A funded party 
should be required to disclose the third-party funding arrangement to the 
judge or arbitrator if that party claims attorney fees under applicable law 
and if the judge or arbitrator orders disclosure of any fee arrangements.  
Disclosure of third-party funding to the opposing side should not be 
mandatory, because the participation of the funder is not material to the 
merits of the underlying dispute.254 However, the parties may come to an 
enforceable agreement during the pretrial conference regarding the 
disclosure or confidentiality of funding arrangements.255  Furthermore, in 
order to prevent waiver of evidentiary privileges for information shared 
with the funder, funders should be included within the exceptions to the 
waiver of evidentiary privileges, which would require amending the 
common law rather than the Federal Rules.256  Arbitration borrows 
evidentiary privileges from national laws around the world based on the 
preferences of the parties and arbitrators, so revising arbitration rules to 
address evidentiary privileges would be unnecessary and would likely 
violate the trans-substantive principle of litigation and arbitration rules of 
procedure.257  
 253  Id. 
 254  See supra Part V.A.1. 
 255  See FED. R. CIV. P. 16; FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 256  See supra Part V.A.1. 
 257  Compare Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (“We have become so transfixed 
by the achievement of James Win. Moore and his colleagues in creating, nurturing, 
expounding and annotating a great trans-substantive code of procedure that we often 
miss the persistent and inevitable tension between procedure generalized across 
substantive lines and procedure applied to implement a particular substantive end. 
There are, indeed, trans-substantive values which may be expressed, and to some 
extent served, by a code of procedure.  But there are also demands of particular 
substantive objectives which cannot be served except through the purposeful 
shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of process to a case or to an area of law.  What 
follows is by no means an attempt to denigrate or undermine the ongoing trans-
substantive achievement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather it is an 
exploration to rediscover the feel of a tension.”) with Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., 
Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244 (1989) (“The second principal criticism 
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This article has suggested various reinterpretations of and revisions 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rules of arbitration procedure 
to address issues relating to the phenomenon of third-party funding.  Rule 
revisions are likely not to happen anytime soon, but fortunately, the 
existing Federal Rules and rules of arbitration provide a framework for 
judges and arbitrators to handle potential third-party funding issues as 
they arise.  In addition, both litigation and arbitration rules provide for 
the judge or arbitrator to use local procedural rules and devise case-by-
case solutions to novel problems for which there is no formal rule on 
point.  These existing features of dispute resolution will help ensure that 
decision makers can address any issues that may arise, even without 
revisions to the procedural rules.  As the third-party funding industry 
grows and matures, rule revisions may be needed, particularly in the 
context of funded class action litigation under Federal Rule 23 and funded 
class arbitration, if those phenomena become more prevalent.  Careful 
observation and documentation of the participation of third-party funders 
in the dispute resolution system will be an integral and essential part of 
any future consideration of relevant revisions to litigation or arbitration 
rules.258  In the meantime, this article has demonstrated that decision 
makers already have the tools that they need to begin observing and 
addressing issues of third-party funding by reinterpreting existing 
framework of litigation and arbitration rules. 
litigation, whereas civil procedure rules properly constructed would be shaped to the 
needs of specific categories of litigation. This critique contemplates separate sets of 
rules for civil rights cases, antitrust cases, routine automobile cases, and so on. The 
criticism has been expressed perhaps most incisively by Professor Robert Cover, 
esteemed colleague prematurely gone from us. Yet despite the great respectability 
of its source, the ‘trans-substantive’ critique seems misguided to me. It overstates 
the reach of the Federal Rules and underestimates the technical and political 
difficulties of trying to tailor procedures to specific types of controversies.”).  Cf. 
supra note 71 regarding the trans-substantivity of arbitration. 
 258  Cf., Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules Agenda Book, supra note 68, at  79 
(“The Conference also prompted a project launched by the Committee and the 
National Employment Lawyers Association to develop protocols for initial 
discovery in individual employment cases. The protocols were developed by a team 
of lawyers evenly balanced between those who commonly represent employees and 
those who commonly represent employers. The protocols have been adopted by 
numerous District Judges; experience  with the protocols has led to calls for more 
widespread adoption, and the hope that similar protocols might be developed for 
other categories of litigation. These programs of education and innovative pilot 
projects continue.”). 
 
 
 
